City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc.
The Supreme Court ruled that a federal law preempting local regulation of motor carriers still lets states hand off their safety-regulation power to cities and counties, so Columbus, Ohio's tow-truck safety rules are not automatically wiped out.
The decision resolves a split among federal appeals courts over whether a narrow federal exception for 'the safety regulatory authority of a State' covers rules made by cities and counties acting on delegated state power, or only rules made by state legislatures themselves.
“Absent a clear statement to the contrary, Congress' reference to the "regulatory authority of a State" should be read to preserve, not preempt, the traditional prerogative of the States to delegate their authority to their constituent parts.”
The Court's core reasoning for why the federal safety exception covers delegated local authority.
How it got here: A federal district court ruled for the tow company and enjoined the city's rules; the Sixth Circuit affirmed based on its earlier ruling against similar Toledo rules; the city sought Supreme Court review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Columbus, Ohio required tow-truck operators to get city licenses, pass inspections, carry certain insurance, keep specified records, and equip their trucks according to city standards. A tow company, Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, and a trade association of tow-truck operators sued the city, arguing that a federal law preempting local regulation of motor carriers wiped out Columbus's rules.
The question before the Court
Can a state let its cities and counties enforce the state's own safety rules for tow trucks, even though a federal law generally bars local regulation of motor carriers?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court ruled that a state's power to set safety rules for motor carriers, including tow trucks, can be delegated to cities and counties, even though the federal statute's general preemption rule expressly names both states and their political subdivisions while the safety exception mentions only "a State." The Court reasoned that local governments ordinarily exercise whatever authority a state chooses to give them, and Congress would need a much clearer statement before courts should assume it meant to block states from using their usual local machinery to enforce safety rules.
The Court stressed this was a closer call than past cases because the statute does sometimes list states and subdivisions separately, but concluded the statute's inconsistent drafting elsewhere weakened any inference that Congress meant to exclude cities specifically from the safety exception. It did not decide whether Columbus's own rules actually qualify as safety regulation, leaving that question for the lower courts on remand.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Cities across the country that license and inspect tow trucks — and other local governments handling motor-carrier safety — can keep enforcing those rules without fear that a federal law automatically voids them, as long as the state has given them that authority. Tow-truck companies challenging local licensing, insurance, or equipment rules will now have to show the specific rule falls outside genuine safety regulation, not just that it was passed by a city rather than a state legislature.
What changes now
The case returns to the Sixth Circuit and the district court to decide, in the first instance, whether Columbus's specific tow-truck rules actually qualify as genuine 'safety regulatory authority' rather than disguised economic regulation of prices, routes, or services. The Supreme Court did not rule on that question, so Columbus's regulations could still be struck down on remand if they are found to exceed safety regulation.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether Columbus's particular tow-truck rules actually count as safety regulation. It only held that a state may delegate its safety-regulatory authority to cities in principle; whether these specific licensing, insurance, and equipment rules qualify remains open on remand.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Scalia
“The only conceivable reason for this specification of "political subdivision" apart from "State" is to establish, in the rule, the two separate categories of state power”Scalia's argument that Congress deliberately distinguished state and local authority in the statute.
Justice Scalia argued the statute's text is clear: Congress listed 'State' and 'political subdivision of a State' separately elsewhere in the same provision, so using 'State' alone in the safety exception must mean state governments only, not cities. He used a football-and-soccer hypothetical to illustrate that naming a broader and narrower term together, then using only the broader term later, signals exclusion of the narrower one. He would have held the safety exception preempts local tow-truck safety rules and affirmed the Sixth Circuit.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court started from the presumption against preemption: federal courts assume Congress did not mean to displace a State's traditional police powers unless Congress made that purpose clear and unmistakable.
- The federal statute generally bars both states and their political subdivisions (cities, counties, and the like) from regulating motor-carrier prices, routes, or services, but carves out an exception preserving 'the safety regulatory authority of a State' without separately mentioning political subdivisions.
- The Court reasoned that a political subdivision ordinarily may exercise whatever portion of state power the state chooses to delegate to it, so a bare reference to 'State' authority is generally read to include power the state has handed down to its local governments, absent a clear statement otherwise.
- The Court found that reading 'State' narrowly to exclude cities would create an odd result: it would let states enact safety rules but bar them from using the ordinary local machinery — city police, inspectors, and licensing offices — to enforce those very rules.
- The Court concluded that Congress's inconsistent drafting across the statute's various exceptions weakened the inference (drawn from the mere absence of the phrase 'political subdivision') that Congress meant to limit the safety exception to state legislatures alone.
- Because the statute's deregulatory purpose targeted economic regulation of trucking, not safety regulation, and other statutory tools already let federal regulators strike down burdensome local safety rules, the Court held that letting states delegate safety authority to cities did not undermine Congress's goals.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier (501 U. S. 597)
The Court relied on Mortier's rule that mere silence about local governments does not show intent to preempt local authority.
Limits Russello v. United States (464 U. S. 16)
The Court found the usual inference from Congress omitting a phrase in one section weaker given the statute's inconsistent drafting.