City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.
The Court ruled that Los Angeles could rely on its 1977 study linking concentrations of adult businesses to higher crime rates to defend a law requiring an adult bookstore and adult video arcade under one roof to split apart, reversing a lower court that had thrown the ordinance out.
The decision loosens the evidentiary bar cities must clear when defending zoning laws aimed at the 'secondary effects' of adult businesses, letting the case go to trial instead of ending on summary judgment.
“The municipality's evidence must fairly support the municipality's rationale for its ordinance.”
The plurality's statement of how much evidence a city must produce to defend secondary-effects zoning.
How it got here: A federal trial court and the Ninth Circuit both ruled against the city on First Amendment grounds; Los Angeles asked the Supreme Court to review the case.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Two Los Angeles adult bookstores each operated a video arcade in the same building as their retail store. A city ordinance, tracing back to a 1977 study linking concentrations of adult businesses to crime, barred more than one adult entertainment business in the same building. The bookstores sued, arguing that forcing them to split their bookstore and arcade into separate locations violated the First Amendment.
The question before the Court
Could Los Angeles require an adult bookstore and adult video arcade that had always shared one roof to split into separate locations, relying on an older citywide study linking concentrations of adult businesses to crime?
The Court's answer
Partly — the Court ruled that Los Angeles could rely on its existing 1977 crime study to defend its ban on combining an adult bookstore and video arcade in one building, at least at this early stage of the lawsuit. The study's finding that concentrations of separate adult establishments correlate with higher crime reasonably supported the city's related theory that concentrating adult operations within a single large establishment could produce similar effects, and the city did not need to prove that was the only possible explanation of the data.
Because a municipality defending this kind of zoning law is entitled to rely on evidence "reasonably believed to be relevant," rather than conclusive proof, the bookstores could not win outright on summary judgment. The Court reversed the ruling against the city and sent the case back for further proceedings, leaving open whether the ordinance will ultimately survive a full trial.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Cities across the country regulate adult bookstores, theaters, and clubs through zoning laws justified by crime and property-value concerns rather than by the content of the speech itself. This ruling makes it easier for local governments to defend that kind of zoning with older or general studies, while businesses challenging such laws face a tougher fight to win early in a lawsuit.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower courts for further proceedings, since the Court held only that the city's evidence was enough to survive summary judgment — not that the ordinance is definitely valid. The bookstores may still try to show at trial that splitting the businesses will not actually reduce crime and that the law's real purpose is to suppress speech. Other cities' secondary-effects zoning laws will likely be evaluated under this same relaxed evidentiary standard.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide that the ordinance is constitutional — only that the city's evidence was sufficient to avoid summary judgment. It left open whether, after a full trial, the evidence would actually show the law reduces crime without significantly diminishing speech, and it did not resolve whether the ordinance is truly content neutral or content based.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality's application of secondary-effects doctrine but argued the analysis was unnecessary altogether. He maintained that the First Amendment does not stop communities from directly regulating, or even entirely banning, businesses that sell sexually explicit material, without needing secondary-effects reasoning at all.
Concurrence — Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy agreed the ordinance could survive summary judgment but rejected calling this kind of zoning law 'content neutral,' insisting such laws are content based though still subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. He argued the city must show that dispersal will cause businesses to relocate rather than close, so that speech is not meaningfully reduced, and found the city's reasoning sufficient here to avoid summary judgment.
Dissent — Justice Souter
“That sounds like a good strategy for driving out expressive adult businesses. It sounds, in other words, like a policy of content-based regulation.”Souter's warning that the breakup policy may really be aimed at suppressing speech rather than crime.
Justice Souter argued the 1977 study showed only that concentrations of separate adult establishments correlate with crime, not that combining a bookstore and arcade under one roof does. He would have required the city to produce evidence tying its specific 'breakup' policy to reduced crime, warning that without such proof the law looks more like a way to raise adult businesses' costs than to fight crime. Justice Breyer joined only the evidentiary discussion in Part II.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied the three-step framework from Renton v. Playtime Theatres for zoning laws aimed at adult businesses: is it a time-place-manner rule, is it 'content neutral,' and does the city show a substantial interest supported by reasonably relevant evidence?
- The Court found it reasonable for the city to infer from its 1977 study — which showed concentrations of separate adult establishments correlate with higher crime — that concentrating adult 'operations' inside a single large establishment could draw similarly dense foot traffic and crime, much like a minimall.
- The Court rejected the lower appellate court's demand that the city prove its theory was the only possible explanation of the data; under the deferential intermediate-scrutiny standard, a city need only offer evidence 'reasonably believed to be relevant,' not conclusive proof ruling out every competing theory.
- Because the challengers had not produced competing evidence undercutting the city's theory, the Court held the 1977 study was enough for the city to survive summary judgment without commissioning new studies specific to combined bookstore-arcades.
- The Court declined Justice Souter's proposal to merge the content-neutrality inquiry with the evidentiary inquiry or to raise the evidentiary bar, reasoning that doing so was not requested by the parties and would make it harder for cities to experiment with zoning solutions to crime.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. (475 U.S. 41)
The Court reaffirmed Renton's framework for evaluating secondary-effects zoning of adult businesses under intermediate scrutiny.