Duncan v. Walker

Background

A state prison official challenged Sherman Walker, a prisoner convicted of robbery in New York in the 1990s. Walker’s last conviction became final in April 1996. He filed a federal habeas petition in April 1996, which the District Court dismissed in July 1996 without prejudice for failing to show he had exhausted state remedies. Walker filed a second federal petition in May 1997; the District Court later dismissed that petition as time barred under AEDPA’s one-year rule.

Reasoning

The central question was whether a federal habeas petition counts as an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" under 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2), which would pause (toll) the one-year deadline while the application is pending. The Court looked at the statute’s wording and related provisions and concluded that the word "State" applies to the whole phrase. Because Congress elsewhere expressly used both "State" and "Federal" when it meant both, the Court held that a federal habeas petition does not toll the deadline. The Court emphasized text and AEDPA’s goals of encouraging state-court review, finality, and federalism, and reversed the Second Circuit.

Real world impact

As a practical matter, prisoners who file a federal habeas petition before exhausting state remedies cannot assume that the time their federal petition spent in court will extend the AEDPA deadline. The Court noted Walker had more than nine months left after his first dismissal but did not return to state court. The Court did not decide whether federal courts may provide equitable relief in other situations.

Dissents or concurrances

Two Justices concurred while noting district courts can stay cases and may use equitable tolling to prevent injustice. The dissent would have allowed tolling for federal petitions to avoid unfair time bars and stressed real-world harms supported by statistics.