Texas v. Cobb
The Supreme Court ruled that a suspect's right to a lawyer under the Sixth Amendment applies only to the specific crime he has actually been charged with, not to other crimes police suspect he committed, even if those crimes are factually related.
Because the man in this case had only been charged with burglary, police could question him about a separate double murder without notifying his burglary lawyer, and his confession to the murders could be used against him.
“The Sixth Amendment right [to counsel] . . . is offense specific.”
The Court's core holding limiting the right to counsel to the specific charged crime.
How it got here: The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the murder conviction, finding the right to counsel extended to the closely related murders; Texas asked the Supreme Court to review that ruling.
The Case in Depth
What happened
A Texas man's neighbors, a mother and young daughter, disappeared after their home was burglarized. He was charged with the burglary and given a lawyer. While free on bond, his father reported that he had confessed to killing the mother. Police then questioned him without his burglary lawyer present, and he confessed to murdering both the mother and daughter after waiving his Miranda rights.
The question before the Court
If police already know a suspect has a lawyer for one crime, can they question him without that lawyer about a different, uncharged crime?
Why it matters
Police can now question people about additional, uncharged crimes without going through a lawyer the suspect already has for a different charge, even when the crimes happened together. This gives law enforcement more room to investigate related offenses, but critics warn it lets officers question represented defendants about closely connected conduct without the lawyer's knowledge.
What changes now
The Supreme Court reversed the Texas court's decision reinstating the suppression of the confession, meaning the confession can be used as evidence. Because the Court ruled against the suspect on the first question (offense-specific scope), it did not need to decide the second question about whether he had validly waived his right to counsel. The case is a final merits decision, not sent back for further factual proceedings.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the suspect validly waived his right to counsel, since it ruled the right never attached to the murder charges in the first place. It also did not disturb Miranda protections, which the majority stressed remain fully available to suspects regardless of this ruling.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority but argued the Court should go further and question the underlying validity of Michigan v. Jackson, the rule barring police from initiating contact with a represented defendant. He argued that rule improperly overrides a suspect's own voluntary choice to speak, and should at most apply only when a suspect clearly and unambiguously asserts a right not to speak without counsel.
Dissent — Justice Breyer
“What Sixth Amendment sense— what common sense — does such a rule make?”Breyer's objection that the majority's rule lets police easily sidestep the right to counsel.
Justice Breyer argued the majority's narrow, technical Blockburger test undermines the Sixth Amendment's purpose and would let police circumvent the right to counsel simply by asking about related but uncharged crimes. He argued for defining 'offense' to include conduct 'closely related to' or 'inextricably intertwined with' the charged crime, the approach nearly every lower court had adopted, and would have affirmed the Texas court's suppression of the confession.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court relied on its earlier statement that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is 'offense specific' — meaning it only protects a person against questioning about the particular crime he has been formally charged with, not any crime he might have committed.
- The Court considered whether to expand this offense-specific rule to cover crimes 'closely related' to the charged offense, an approach several lower courts had adopted, but concluded that the cases those courts relied on never actually decided that question.
- To decide how broadly an 'offense' should be defined, the Court borrowed a test from double-jeopardy law (the Blockburger test), which treats two crimes as the same offense only if each requires proof of a fact the other does not.
- Applying that test, the Court found that burglary and capital murder each require proof of different facts, so they count as separate offenses under the Sixth Amendment.
- Because the murders were a legally separate offense from the burglary he had a lawyer for, the Court held his right to counsel had not yet attached to the murders, and Miranda's separate protections were enough safeguard during that questioning.
- The Court concluded that his confession to the murders was therefore admissible despite the absence of his burglary lawyer during questioning.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Michigan v. Jackson (475 U.S. 625)
The majority declined to reaffirm or expand this case, and Kennedy's concurrence questioned its continued validity.
Reaffirms McNeil v. Wisconsin (501 U.S. 171)
The Court relied on and reaffirmed McNeil's statement that the right to counsel is offense specific.
Reaffirms Blockburger v. United States (284 U.S. 299)
The Court imported this double-jeopardy test to define what counts as the 'same offense' for right-to-counsel purposes.