OCTOBER TERM 2000 · DECIDED FEBRUARY 20, 2001 · 8–1

531 U.S. 326 · No. 99-1132 · Argued November 1, 2000

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Illinois v. McArthur

Reversed and remandedFinal ruling
Fourth Amendmentpolice searchessearch warrantshome privacydrug possession

Opinion of the Court by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg

The Court ruled that police did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they barred a man from entering his own home unaccompanied for about two hours while officers went to get a search warrant for marijuana they had probable cause to believe was inside.

The decision confirms that police can impose a brief, narrowly tailored restraint on someone's access to their home to stop them from destroying evidence, as long as they have probable cause and are working diligently to get a warrant rather than searching or arresting without one.

They did not violate the Amendment's requirements.
Justice Breyer

The Court's core conclusion that police acted lawfully in restraining the man from his home.

How it got here: A trial court suppressed the evidence as the fruit of an unlawful seizure; the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed and the Illinois Supreme Court denied review, prompting the State's petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Case in Depth

What happened

A woman asked police to accompany her while she removed belongings from the trailer she shared with her husband. She told an officer that her husband had hidden marijuana under the couch. When the husband refused to let police search, one officer left to get a warrant while another kept the husband from reentering the trailer alone for about two hours. The search then turned up marijuana and a pipe, leading to misdemeanor drug charges.

The question before the Court

Could police keep a man from going back into his home alone for two hours, without a warrant, while they went to get one to search for marijuana?

The Court's answer

Yes — the Court held that police acted reasonably and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Rather than applying a strict rule requiring a warrant before any restraint, the Court balanced the privacy interests at stake against the law enforcement need to prevent destruction of evidence, weighing several facts together: police had probable cause, they had good reason to fear the man would destroy the drugs, they chose a much less intrusive option than searching or arresting him immediately, and they kept him out for only as long as was reasonably necessary to get the warrant.

Because all of these circumstances lined up—reliable information, a real risk of destroyed evidence, a modest restriction, and a short timeframe—the temporary exclusion from the home was a reasonable seizure that the Fourth Amendment allowed, even without a warrant authorizing it.

Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →

Why it matters

Police departments now have clearer authority to briefly restrict a person from entering their own home to prevent them from destroying evidence while officers seek a warrant, without needing to search the home first or make an arrest. Homeowners retain protection against warrantless searches, but face a real risk of temporary exclusion from their homes if police have probable cause and act quickly.

What changes now

The Supreme Court's ruling reverses the Illinois Appellate Court's decision suppressing the evidence and sends the case back to the Illinois courts for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. This is a final decision on the Fourth Amendment question, meaning the marijuana and paraphernalia evidence can now potentially be used against the man in continuing state misdemeanor proceedings, subject to any further state-court proceedings on remand.

What this does not decide

The Court expressly did not decide whether a greater restriction would have been justified for this type of offense, or whether the same restriction would be reasonable if only a "nonjailable" offense were at issue, leaving those questions open for future cases.

Concurrences and dissents

Concurrence — Justice Souter

Justice Souter agreed with the majority but wrote separately to explain why police could have entered and searched the trailer immediately while the man was inside, yet chose the less intrusive option of impounding it from outside instead. He reasoned that the law's strong preference for warrants justifies favoring impoundment over an immediate warrantless search, since a warrant carries more weight on judicial review and police should get a fair chance to obtain one.

Dissent — Justice Stevens

Each of the Illinois jurists who participated in the decision of this case placed a higher value on the sanctity of the ordinary citizen's home than on the prosecution of this petty offense.Stevens's central objection that the majority undervalued the sanctity of the home.

Justice Stevens argued the case was a poor vehicle for deciding the issue because Illinois treats small-marijuana possession as a minor offense not prioritized for enforcement, and he would have dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. Reaching the merits, he found the majority struck the balance wrong, arguing that the sanctity of the home should have outweighed the interest in prosecuting this petty offense, following the reasoning of Welsh v. Wisconsin.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court explained that while the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires a warrant before officers can seize property, it has long recognized exceptions for situations involving urgent law enforcement needs, known as 'exigent circumstances,' where waiting for a warrant would risk losing evidence.
  2. Rather than treating the warrantless restriction as automatically unlawful, the Court used a balancing test, weighing the privacy interests of the homeowner against the law enforcement interest in preventing destruction of evidence, to decide whether the restraint was reasonable overall.
  3. Applying that balance, the Court found four facts working together: police had probable cause based on a firsthand account from the man's wife; they reasonably feared he would destroy the drugs if left unwatched; they chose the least intrusive option available, barring only unaccompanied entry rather than searching or arresting him; and they limited the restriction to about two hours, no longer than needed to diligently obtain the warrant.
  4. The Court found support in its precedent recognizing that police may seal off premises from the outside while awaiting a warrant, distinguishing this case from prior rulings that struck down warrantless home entries or searches for evidence of minor, 'nonjailable' offenses, because the offenses here carried potential jail time.
  5. The Court also rejected the argument that standing on a home's porch made the restriction more intrusive, concluding that whether the man was on the porch or elsewhere near the home did not change the reasonableness analysis under the Fourth Amendment.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

Fourth Amendment

Protects people against unreasonable government searches and seizures of their homes and property.

Cases affected by this decision

Distinguishes Welsh v. Wisconsin (466 U.S. 740)

The Court said this case involved jailable offenses, unlike the nonjailable offense in Welsh, so Welsh did not control.

Reaffirms Segura v. United States (468 U.S. 796)

The Court relied on Segura's assumption that police may seal off a home from outside while awaiting a warrant.

Supreme Court Opinion

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Illinois v. McArthur | SCOTUS Reporter