California Democratic Party v. Jones
The Supreme Court struck down California's blanket primary system, ruling that forcing political parties to let non-members and rival-party voters help choose their nominees violates the parties' First Amendment right to associate with only those who share their views.
The decision protects political parties' control over their own candidate-selection process, even when a state believes a more open system would produce more moderate, broadly popular nominees.
“We can think of no heavier burden on a political party's associational freedom.”
The Court's assessment of how severely the blanket primary burdened parties' rights to choose their own nominees.
How it got here: A federal trial court upheld the blanket primary against the parties' First Amendment challenge; the Ninth Circuit affirmed by adopting the trial court's opinion; the Supreme Court agreed to hear the parties' appeal.
The Case in Depth
What happened
California voters had passed Proposition 198 in 1996, replacing the state's closed primary (where only registered party members could vote for that party's nominees) with a "blanket" primary letting any voter, regardless of party, vote for any candidate on the primary ballot. Four political parties, each barring non-members from voting in their primaries, sued the California Secretary of State, arguing the new system violated their right to control who selects their nominees.
The question before the Court
Could California force political parties to let voters who weren't party members help pick each party's nominee in a "blanket" primary?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that California's blanket primary imposed a severe, unjustified burden on political parties' First Amendment right of association. Choosing a nominee is one of the most important things a party does, and letting nonmembers and even members of rival parties help make that choice forces the party to associate with people who may not share, or may actively oppose, its views.
Because the burden was severe, California needed a compelling reason narrowly tailored to justify it. The state's asserted interests — producing more moderate nominees, expanding debate, aiding "disenfranchised" independents, fairness, choice, participation, and privacy — either amounted to disapproving of parties choosing their own candidates or weren't compelling enough. And a less intrusive option, a nonpartisan blanket primary that doesn't determine any party's official nominee, was available.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Political parties in California and states with similar systems keep the final say over who represents them on the ballot, without outside voters or rival-party members swaying that choice. Voters who want a voice in a party's nomination now generally need to register with that party rather than relying on a blanket primary ballot.
What changes now
This is a final merits decision, so California's blanket primary system as applied to partisan nominations cannot stand. The state may adopt alternative systems, such as a nonpartisan blanket primary (where candidates advance to the general election without representing any party's official nomination), that don't force parties to let outsiders choose their nominees. The ruling does not address open primaries, which the Court expressly left undecided, or the separate Elections Clause question the dissent raised about the initiative process for federal elections.
What this does not decide
The Court expressly did not decide the constitutionality of "open primaries," where any voter may participate but must pick one party's full slate of candidates, as opposed to the "blanket" primary at issue here. It also left unresolved the dissent's separate question about whether a voter initiative can validly set election rules for federal offices under the Elections Clause.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy agreed the blanket primary was unconstitutional because its true purpose was to force parties to change their doctrinal positions, not merely to make elections more open. He added that the problem is compounded by campaign-finance rulings limiting how much a party can spend in coordination with its own candidate, meaning parties can be squeezed both by losing control of nominee selection and by being restricted in defending their preferred candidate financially.
Dissent — Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens argued the majority wrongly imported a private association's 'right not to associate' into the context of a state-run, state-financed primary election, which he viewed as fundamentally public rather than internal party business. He also raised, without deciding, a separate concern under the Elections Clause about whether a voter initiative rather than the state legislature can validly set the manner of electing federal senators and representatives.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court recognized that while states have broad authority to structure elections and even require parties to use primaries, that authority does not make a party's internal nomination process a wholly public affair open to unlimited state control; parties retain First Amendment associational rights in choosing their standard-bearer.
- A core part of the freedom to associate is the corollary 'right not to associate' — the freedom to exclude people who don't share the group's views from decisions that define the group's identity and message, which the Court found applies with particular force to choosing a party's nominee.
- Applying that principle, the Court found the blanket primary qualitatively different from a closed primary: unlike a closed primary, where a crossover voter must at least formally join the party, the blanket primary let people who refused to affiliate — or who affiliated with a rival party — help pick the nominee.
- The Court reviewed survey evidence and expert testimony showing substantial numbers of voters crossing party lines in blanket-primary states, and concluded this posed a real risk of altering the identity and positions of a party's nominee, amounting to a severe burden on associational rights requiring the strictest level of review, known as strict scrutiny — a test requiring a compelling government reason and a law narrowly tailored to serve it.
- Measured against strict scrutiny, the Court found none of California's seven asserted interests compelling: some were simply relabeled objections to parties choosing their own nominees, and others (fairness, choice, participation, privacy) did not rise to the level required, especially since a nonpartisan blanket primary — where the top vote-getters advance without becoming any party's official nominee — could serve the same goals without burdening party nomination rights.
- Because a less restrictive alternative existed and the burden was severe, the Court concluded Proposition 198's blanket primary was not narrowly tailored to any compelling interest and therefore violated the parties' First Amendment associational rights.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette (450 U.S. 107)
The Court relied on this case as establishing that states cannot force parties to accept nominating results reached with outside participation.
Reaffirms Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn. (479 U.S. 208)
The Court leaned on this decision protecting a party's own choice to include independents as still-good law supporting party control over primaries.
Distinguishes Smith v. Allwright (321 U.S. 649)
The Court said this case about racial exclusion in primaries doesn't mean party affairs are entirely public and unprotected by the First Amendment.
Distinguishes Terry v. Adams (345 U.S. 461)
Like Allwright, the Court held this case doesn't establish that primaries are free of First Amendment protection for parties.