United States v. Morrison
The Court struck down the part of the Violence Against Women Act that let victims of gender-motivated violence sue their attackers in federal court, ruling that Congress had no constitutional power to create that remedy.
The decision reinforces limits on Congress's power under both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that violent crime, even when it affects the economy in the aggregate, remains a matter for the states to police, not the federal government.
“Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”
The Court's key reason for refusing to treat the law as a valid regulation of interstate commerce.
How it got here: A federal trial court dismissed the claim as unconstitutional; a Fourth Circuit panel reversed, but the en banc Fourth Circuit struck down the law, prompting Supreme Court review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Christy Brzonkala, a Virginia Tech student, alleged that fellow students Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, both varsity football players, assaulted and raped her shortly after they met. A university disciplinary process initially found Morrison responsible but later set aside his punishment. Brzonkala sued Morrison and Crawford under a federal law, part of the Violence Against Women Act, that let victims of gender-motivated violence sue their attackers for damages in federal court.
The question before the Court
Could Congress let victims of gender-motivated violence, like sexual assault, sue their attackers directly in federal court?
Why it matters
Victims of gender-motivated violence lost a federal civil-lawsuit option and must instead rely on state courts and state law. The ruling also signals to Congress that laws reaching purely local, noneconomic conduct — even with extensive supporting evidence — may not survive if they intrude too far into areas traditionally handled by the states.
What changes now
The ruling is final on the merits: the federal civil remedy in the Violence Against Women Act is void, and Brzonkala's case cannot proceed under that provision. She and other victims of gender-motivated violence must pursue remedies, if any, through state courts and state law. The decision does not affect other parts of the Violence Against Women Act, such as its criminal provisions or funding programs.
What this does not decide
The Court did not rule on the federal criminal provisions of the Violence Against Women Act, which require crossing state lines and were not challenged here. It also did not decide whether some other, more narrowly tailored version of a civil remedy, one tied more closely to interstate commerce or targeted at biased state officials, might be constitutional.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas joined the majority in full but wrote separately to argue that the Court's 'substantial effects' test itself is illegitimate. He would go further than the majority and abandon that test entirely, arguing it has no basis in the original understanding of the Commerce Clause and has let Congress claim virtually unlimited power.
Dissent — Justice Souter
Justice Souter argued the majority's ruling is inconsistent with decades of Commerce Clause precedent, which asks only whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding that aggregated conduct substantially affects interstate commerce. He pointed to Congress's extensive factual record on gender-motivated violence and argued the majority's economic/noneconomic distinction is unworkable and revives discredited pre-1937 formalism.
Dissent — Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer, largely agreeing with Souter, argued that the economic/noneconomic distinction is nearly impossible to apply consistently and that courts lack the tools to draw such lines. He would leave the balance between federal and state power primarily to the political process, and separately expressed doubt about the majority's Fourteenth Amendment reasoning without resolving it.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied the framework from United States v. Lopez, which recognizes three categories of activity Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause, and asked whether gender-motivated violence substantially affects interstate commerce when its effects are added up nationwide.
- The Court held that Congress may aggregate the effects of intrastate conduct only when that conduct is itself economic in nature; because violent crime is not economic activity, the reasoning used to justify the law would let Congress regulate almost any crime or family matter, erasing the line between national and local authority.
- The law also lacked a jurisdictional hook tying individual cases to interstate commerce, and while Congress had made extensive findings about the law's economic effects, the Court said such findings could not by themselves establish that Congress had the constitutional authority to act.
- Turning to the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement clause, the Court reaffirmed that this Amendment restricts only state action, not the conduct of private individuals, relying on two 1883 decisions, United States v. Harris and the Civil Rights Cases.
- Because the civil remedy applied to private attackers rather than correcting biased state officials or state laws, and applied uniformly nationwide rather than targeting states where bias was actually found, the Court concluded it was not a proportionate response to any state constitutional violation and fell outside Congress's enforcement power.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms United States v. Lopez (514 U.S. 549)
The Court relies on Lopez's framework distinguishing economic from noneconomic activity to strike down the law.
Reaffirms United States v. Harris (106 U.S. 629)
The Court leans on this 1883 case's rule that the Fourteenth Amendment reaches only state action, not private conduct.
Reaffirms Civil Rights Cases (109 U.S. 3)
The Court reaffirms this decision's limit on Congress's power to regulate purely private conduct under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Distinguishes United States v. Guest (383 U.S. 745)
The Court says Guest did not actually revisit or undermine the state-action limits set by Harris and the Civil Rights Cases.