Slack v. McDaniel
The Court ruled that a Nevada prisoner's later habeas petition was not "second or successive" just because an earlier petition had been dismissed without being decided, for failing to exhaust state-court remedies first. It also clarified the standard prisoners must meet to get permission to appeal when a federal court throws out a habeas case on procedural grounds without ever reaching the constitutional claim.
The decision protects prisoners who follow the exhaustion process from having their return trip to federal court treated as an abusive repeat filing, while still letting courts guard against genuine litigation abuse through other tools like dismissal orders.
How it got here: The District Court dismissed Slack's 1995 petition as second or successive and on exhaustion grounds; the Ninth Circuit denied permission to appeal, and the Supreme Court granted review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Antonio Slack was convicted of second-degree murder in Nevada. He filed a federal habeas petition in 1991, then paused it to go exhaust new claims in state court, and the petition was dismissed without prejudice. After finishing the state proceedings, he filed a new federal petition in 1995 with both old and new claims. The State argued this new petition was an abusive "second or successive" filing and asked the court to dismiss it.
The question before the Court
If a prisoner's first federal habeas petition is dismissed because he hadn't yet exhausted his claims in state court, does his later, exhausted petition count as a "second or successive" petition, and what must he show to appeal a habeas denial after Congress tightened the appeal rules in 1996?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that Slack's 1995 petition was not a "second or successive" petition. Because his earlier 1991 petition was dismissed without any claim being decided on the merits (it was dismissed only because it mixed exhausted and unexhausted claims), his later, exhausted petition had to be treated like an ordinary first petition, not one subject to the stricter limits on repeat filings.
The Court also set out the standard for getting permission to appeal when a habeas case is dismissed on procedural grounds: a prisoner must show both that reasonable judges could debate whether the constitutional claim is valid and that reasonable judges could debate whether the procedural ruling was correct. Whether Slack meets that standard on his specific claims was left for the lower courts to decide on remand.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
State and federal prisoners who must first exhaust claims in state court before returning to federal habeas court now have clearer assurance that doing so correctly won't cost them their case as an improper "second" filing. The ruling also gives prisoners and courts a workable two-part test for when a procedural dismissal can still be appealed.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower courts, where the question of whether Slack can actually obtain permission to appeal (a certificate of appealability) on his constitutional claims must still be resolved, since that issue was not addressed below. This is a final merits ruling on the legal standards involved, not a temporary order, though further proceedings on Slack's specific claims remain ahead.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether Slack actually qualifies for a certificate of appealability on the merits of his constitutional claims — that question was left for the lower courts to address on remand, since it hadn't been briefed under the correct legal standard.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence in part — Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens agreed with the Court's overall judgment and joined most of the opinion, but disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the newer certificate-of-appealability requirement governs appeals in cases that began in the district court before the 1996 law took effect. He sided instead with several Courts of Appeals holding that the older standard should apply to such appeals.
Dissent in part — Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia joined the Court's opinion except for its ruling that a petition filed after exhaustion is not second or successive. He argued the Court stretched prior cases beyond their actual holdings and that including new, unexhausted claims in the later petition should have made it second or successive, meaning Slack should not get permission to appeal and the lower court's decision should stand.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first decided which version of the appeal statute applies: because an appeal is a separate step from the trial-court case, the newer certificate-of-appealability requirement enacted in 1996 governs any appeal filed after that law's effective date, even if the underlying habeas case started earlier in the district court.
- The Court then set the standard for getting permission to appeal (a certificate of appealability) when a habeas case was thrown out on procedural grounds without the court ever reaching the prisoner's constitutional claim: the prisoner must show both that reasonable judges could debate whether the constitutional claim is valid, and that reasonable judges could debate whether the procedural dismissal was correct.
- Turning to the merits question, the Court examined the term 'second or successive petition,' a specific legal label carrying consequences under prior habeas rulings, and asked whether it covers a petition filed after an earlier one was dismissed, unresolved, solely because it mixed claims already raised in state court with claims that were not.
- Relying on its precedents, the Court concluded that a petition dismissed before any of its claims were decided, because the prisoner hadn't yet finished the state-court exhaustion process, should be treated like an ordinary first petition once refiled, not as a second or successive one carrying stricter limits.
- The Court held that district courts retain other tools, such as attaching conditions to a dismissal or applying ordinary civil dismissal rules, to prevent prisoners from misusing the exhaustion process to file repeated, drawn-out petitions.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Rose v. Lundy (455 U. S. 509)
The Court relied on this case's exhaustion rule to conclude a mixed petition dismissal doesn't create a second petition problem.
Abrogates Farmer v. McDaniel
The Ninth Circuit's rule treating post-exhaustion petitions as second or successive was rejected as incorrect.