Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC
The Supreme Court upheld Missouri's limits on campaign contributions to candidates for state office, ruling that its 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo allows states, not just the federal government, to cap contributions to fight corruption and its appearance.
The Court also rejected the idea that inflation since 1976 required states to set higher dollar limits than Missouri had chosen, reaffirming that states have real, if not unlimited, room to regulate campaign money.
How it got here: A federal trial court upheld Missouri's law; the Eighth Circuit reversed, applying strict scrutiny; Missouri's Attorney General asked the Supreme Court to review that ruling.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Missouri capped contributions to candidates for state offices like governor and state auditor, with limits ranging from $250 to $1,075 depending on the office. A political action committee and a candidate for state auditor, Zev David Fredman, sued, arguing the caps were too low to let candidates run effective campaigns and violated their First Amendment rights to speech and association.
The question before the Court
Could a state set its own dollar limits on campaign contributions to candidates, even without proving actual corruption or matching the exact dollar figures the Court approved for federal races in 1976?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court ruled that Missouri could set its own contribution limits for state candidates, because its 1976 ruling in Buckley v. Valeo established that governments can limit contributions (as opposed to spending) to fight corruption and its appearance, and that principle applies to states as much as to Congress. Missouri did not need to independently prove actual bribery scandals; evidence supporting the same general concern about large-donor influence that justified the federal limits in Buckley was enough here.
The Court also rejected the argument that inflation since 1976 required Missouri's limits to be pegged to Buckley's dollar figures adjusted for inflation. The real question is whether a contribution limit is so low that candidates cannot raise enough money to run an effective campaign — and the evidence showed Missouri candidates were still able to do so.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
States across the country that limit how much individuals and groups can give to political candidates can keep enforcing those laws without needing to produce extensive proof of actual bribery. Candidates and donors in state elections remain subject to contribution caps, while the ruling leaves independent campaign spending largely free from such limits.
What changes now
The case is sent back to the Eighth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling, meaning Missouri's contribution limits can now be enforced. This is a final decision on the merits regarding the constitutional standard for state contribution limits, though it leaves open how much evidence might be required in future cases with a weaker factual record, and it does not resolve broader questions about soft money or independent campaign spending.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether every state contribution limit is automatically valid, nor did it set a precise evidentiary floor for future cases — it noted this record was strong enough without defining the minimum showing required elsewhere. It also did not reconsider or overrule Buckley, and did not address soft money or independent expenditure limits.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens argued that money is property, not speech, and that campaign contribution limits should be understood as regulating property and liberty interests rather than raising full First Amendment speech concerns. He suggested this framing better explains why expenditure limits were struck down in Buckley while contribution limits were upheld.
Concurrence — Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that campaign finance laws pit competing First Amendment interests against each other, so neither a strong presumption of unconstitutionality nor mechanical strict scrutiny fits; instead courts should balance interests and defer to legislatures' institutional expertise unless a law entrenches incumbents. He would uphold Missouri's law under that balancing approach.
Dissent — Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy argued that Buckley's distinction between contributions and expenditures had driven political money underground into unaccountable 'soft money' and covert issue advocacy, making the system worse than before. He would overrule Buckley and let legislatures try comprehensive reforms covering both contributions and expenditures.
Dissent — Justice Thomas
“Because the Court errs with each step it takes, I dissent.”Justice Thomas's summary of his broader objection that the majority misapplies Buckley.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, argued that Buckley was wrongly decided from the start because its 'speech by proxy' rationale for treating contributions as less protected than expenditures has since been rejected by the Court's other cases. He would apply strict scrutiny to contribution limits, under which he said Missouri's caps would be unconstitutional as overinclusive and poorly tailored.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court read its 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo as establishing that contribution limits, unlike spending limits, need only be 'closely drawn' to match a 'sufficiently important' government interest — a less demanding test than strict scrutiny, which requires the government's reason to be 'compelling' and the law to be the least restrictive option available.
- Because Buckley had already found that preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption was a sufficient reason to justify contribution limits, the Court held that a state does not need to independently prove actual bribery or a specific local corruption scandal to justify similar limits — evidence that large-donor corruption is a real, non-speculative danger, drawn from Buckley itself and from the record here, was enough.
- The Court found that Missouri had supplied enough supporting evidence — a state senator's affidavit, newspaper accounts of suspicious large donations, and a lopsided ballot vote for even stricter limits — to show the same kind of corruption concern that justified the federal limits in Buckley.
- The Court rejected the argument that Buckley set a constitutional floor pegged to 1976 dollars, explaining that the real test is whether a contribution limit is so low that it stops candidates from raising enough money to mount an effective campaign, not whether it matches an inflation-adjusted number.
- Applying that standard, the Court found no proof that Missouri's limits had choked off candidates' ability to campaign, since the evidence showed candidates were still raising sufficient funds and the vast majority of past contributions fell below the new caps anyway.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1)
The Court relied on Buckley as controlling authority that contribution limits can be justified by preventing corruption.