Smith v. Robbins
The Court ruled that California's alternative procedure for handling frivolous criminal appeals -- which lets a lawyer stay silent on the merits while asking the court to independently review the whole record -- satisfies the Constitution, even though it differs from the specific steps described in the Court's 1967 Anders decision.
The ruling makes clear that Anders set out only one acceptable method, not a mandatory blueprint, giving states more freedom to design their own systems for indigent appeals as long as those systems still connect the outcome of an appeal to its actual merit.
“The procedure we sketched in Anders is a prophylactic one; the States are free to adopt different procedures, so long as those procedures adequately safeguard a defendant's right to appellate counsel.”
The majority's central holding that Anders sets only a suggested, not mandatory, procedure.
How it got here: A federal district court granted habeas relief and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that California's Wende procedure violated Anders; California asked the Supreme Court to review that ruling.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Lee Robbins was convicted by a California jury of second-degree murder and grand theft. He represented himself at trial but was appointed a lawyer for his appeal. That lawyer, believing the appeal was frivolous, filed a brief under California's Wende procedure rather than the federal Anders procedure, summarizing the record but not raising specific legal arguments. Robbins filed his own pro se brief but the state courts affirmed his conviction.
The question before the Court
Does every state have to follow the exact procedure the Supreme Court described in Anders v. California for handling appeals a lawyer thinks are frivolous, or can states use a different process, like California's Wende procedure?
The Court's answer
No -- states are not required to follow the exact procedure the Court described in Anders v. California. The Court held that Anders was only a prophylactic suggestion, not a constitutional mandate, so states may adopt different procedures for screening frivolous indigent appeals as long as those procedures reasonably tie the outcome of an appeal to its actual merit.
Applying that standard, the Court found California's Wende procedure -- which requires an independent, full review of the record by both defense counsel and the appellate court before an appeal can be deemed frivolous -- adequately protects an indigent defendant's right to appellate counsel, even though it does not require counsel to identify specific arguable issues the way Anders does.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
States that had adopted procedures modeled on California's Wende system, or were considering alternatives to Anders, now have constitutional clearance to keep using them. Indigent defendants in those states will continue to have their frivolous-appeal determinations made without a merits-focused brief from their own lawyer, relying instead on independent judicial review of the full record.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower courts to apply the Strickland standard to Robbins's specific claim that his appellate lawyer overlooked genuinely arguable issues. The courts below must now determine whether a competent lawyer would have found a nonfrivolous issue and, if so, whether raising it would have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome on appeal. This is a final merits ruling on the constitutionality of the Wende procedure itself, though Robbins's individual claim remains open on remand.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether Robbins's own appeal was actually frivolous or whether his lawyer's performance was constitutionally deficient in his specific case -- that question goes back to the lower courts under the Strickland standard. The ruling also does not require any particular state to use Wende or any specific alternative to Anders.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens joined Souter's dissent in full but wrote separately to argue that the majority had effectively, if silently, overruled Anders and Penson without saying so. He also criticized the majority for casually rejecting the reasoning of McCoy, which recognized that requiring a lawyer to explain why issues lack merit forces careful analysis that benefits the client and the court.
Dissent — Justice Souter
“The Wende procedure does not assure even the most minimal assistance of counsel in an adversarial role.”Souter's core objection that California's procedure fails to guarantee genuine adversarial representation.
Justice Souter argued that California's Wende procedure fails to guarantee the adversarial, partisan review that the Constitution requires, because it lets a lawyer stay silent about any arguable issues rather than flagging them as Anders requires. He would have held that the absence of an advocate's issue-spotting analysis is itself a denial of counsel warranting a presumption of prejudice, entitling Robbins to a new appeal without a separate showing of harm.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court explained that the procedure it laid out in Anders v. California was a prophylactic safeguard -- a suggested method for protecting the right to appellate counsel -- rather than a constitutional command that binds every state to identical steps.
- Reviewing its own precedents (McCoy, Finley, Penson), the Court found none had actually held Anders's specific steps mandatory, and that language suggesting otherwise was not necessary to those decisions' outcomes.
- The Court set out the real constitutional test: a state's procedure for handling indigent appeals satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment so long as it reasonably ensures that the appeal's outcome is tied to its actual merit, rather than to arbitrary factors like poverty.
- Applying that test, the Court compared California's Wende procedure -- which requires both counsel and the appellate court to review the whole record and find the appeal frivolous before affirming -- to procedures it had previously struck down, and found Wende provided at least as much protection.
- Because Wende required two full, independent reviews of the record and did not allow counsel to withdraw or the court to decide without appointing new counsel if arguable issues existed, the Court concluded Wende adequately safeguards the right to appellate counsel and does not violate the Constitution.
- Having upheld the Wende procedure itself, the Court turned to whether Robbins's specific appeal was wrongly treated as frivolous, and directed that this question be evaluated under the ordinary ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard from Strickland v. Washington, requiring Robbins to show both unreasonable performance and a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Limits Anders v. California (386 U.S. 738)
Clarifies that the specific procedure described in Anders is only one constitutionally acceptable method, not a mandatory rule for all states.
Distinguishes McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1 (486 U.S. 429)
The Court questioned McCoy's description of Wisconsin's procedure as going 'one step further' than Anders, noting it may have provided less effective advocacy.
Limits Penson v. Ohio (488 U.S. 75)
The Court found Penson's language suggesting Anders is mandatory was unnecessary dicta, not a binding holding.