Printz v. United States
The Court struck down the part of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that ordered local sheriffs and police chiefs to run background checks on handgun buyers, ruling that the federal government cannot force state and local officials to carry out federal programs.
The decision established a firm constitutional line protecting states from being conscripted as the enforcement arm of federal law, a principle that continues to limit how Congress can involve state and local governments in federal regulatory schemes.
“The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”
The Court's central holding barring Congress from commandeering state governments.
How it got here: Federal trial courts ruled the background-check duty unconstitutional but severable; the Ninth Circuit reversed and upheld the whole scheme; the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Congress passed the Brady Act in 1993 to reduce gun violence by requiring background checks before handgun sales. Until a national instant-check system was ready, the law temporarily required local "chief law enforcement officers" — sheriffs and police chiefs — to receive buyer information and check it against available records. Sheriffs Jay Printz of Montana and Richard Mack of Arizona objected to being forced to do this federal work and sued to block the requirement.
The question before the Court
Could Congress require local sheriffs to run background checks on handgun buyers under the federal Brady gun law?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that Congress cannot force state or local law enforcement officers to carry out a federal regulatory program like the Brady Act's background-check requirement. The Constitution's design of separate state and federal governments means the federal government must use its own officials to enforce its own laws, rather than commandeering state and local officers to do that work for it, even temporarily and even for modest tasks.
This holding built directly on the Court's earlier ruling in New York v. United States, which barred Congress from ordering state legislatures to pass particular laws. Printz extended that same anti-commandeering principle to state executive officials, striking down the sheriffs' background-check and record-handling duties while leaving voluntary state participation, funding-based programs, and other cooperative arrangements untouched.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Local police chiefs and sheriffs were freed from a federal mandate to perform gun-buyer background checks, shifting that burden back onto a voluntary basis until a national system took over. More broadly, the ruling gives state and local officials — and the governments that employ them — a shield against future federal laws that try to dragoon them into administering federal programs without their consent.
What changes now
The background-check and record-handling requirements imposed directly on CLEOs were struck down as unconstitutional, though states and officers remained free to participate voluntarily. The interim provisions were already set to expire once a national instant-check system began operating in 1998. The Court left open questions about firearms dealers' separate obligations and about other federal reporting statutes not challenged in this case, meaning those issues would need to be litigated separately if disputed.
What this does not decide
The Court expressly did not decide whether purely informational reporting requirements imposed on states are unconstitutional, whether firearms dealers still had to forward forms to CLEOs, or whether Congress could condition federal funds on state cooperation. It also did not address the Second Amendment issue Justice Thomas raised in concurrence.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor stressed the ruling's limits: states and officers may still volunteer to participate, the requirements are only temporary, and Congress remains free to restructure the program on a contractual, funding-conditioned basis. She noted the Court did not decide whether purely ministerial federal reporting requirements on states are similarly invalid.
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas agreed the Brady Act violated the Tenth Amendment but wrote separately to argue the federal government's power is strictly limited to enumerated powers. He questioned whether the Commerce Clause even reaches purely intrastate gun sales, and suggested the Second Amendment might independently bar this kind of federal gun regulation, though he did not reach that question.
Dissent — Justice Stevens
“There is not a clause, sentence, or paragraph in the entire text of the Constitution of the United States that supports the proposition that a local police officer can ignore a command contained in a statute enacted by Congress pursuant to an express delegation of power enumerated in Article I.”Stevens's core objection that nothing in the Constitution bars Congress from directing local officers.
Justice Stevens argued the text, history, and structure of the Constitution all support Congress's power to impose duties on state officers when exercising its delegated powers, pointing to early statutes requiring state judges to perform federal tasks and Federalist Papers passages describing state officials as 'auxiliaries' of the national government. He would have upheld the Brady Act's temporary, modest burden on local officers.
Dissent — Justice Souter
Justice Souter joined Stevens's dissent but wrote separately to explain that it was specifically The Federalist No. 27's language about state officials being 'incorporated' and made 'auxiliary' to national law that persuaded him the Framers contemplated Congress directing state officers, while cautioning this would not extend to commanding state legislatures.
Dissent — Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer added a comparative perspective, noting that other federal systems like Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union rely on constituent states to implement central laws and view this as protective of local autonomy and liberty, suggesting the majority's fear of commandeering was not compelled by structural necessity.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court looked to historical practice first, finding that the earliest Congresses almost never directly commanded state executive officials (as opposed to state judges) to carry out federal duties, which it read as evidence that the Constitution was not understood to allow this.
- It then turned to the Constitution's structure, explaining that the system of 'dual sovereignty' — separate and independent state and federal governments — depends on each level answering to its own citizens, and that letting Congress command state officials would blur that accountability and let the federal government expand its reach 'at no cost to itself.'
- The Court also invoked separation of powers, reasoning that forcing state officers to administer federal law would let Congress bypass the President's constitutional duty to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed,' undermining the unity and accountability of the federal executive branch.
- Applying these principles to the Brady Act, the Court rejected the government's attempt to distinguish this case from New York v. United States (which barred commandeering state legislatures) by arguing that ordering individual officers to enforce law is different from ordering the state itself; the Court found no constitutionally meaningful difference, since officers act in their official, state capacity.
- The Court concluded that whether or not the federal mandate involved 'policymaking' by local officers was irrelevant, and that no case-by-case weighing of burdens and benefits could save a law whose whole object is to direct the functioning of state government.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms New York v. United States (505 U. S. 144)
The Court relied on and extended this ruling that Congress cannot force states to enact or administer federal regulatory programs.
Distinguishes Testa v. Katt (330 U. S. 386)
The Court said this case only requires state courts to apply federal law, not requiring state executive officers to enforce it.
Distinguishes FERC v. Mississippi (456 U. S. 742)
The Court said this case upheld only preconditions on continued state regulation, not a true command to administer federal law.