Bush v. Vera
The Supreme Court struck down three Texas congressional districts, ruling that race, not politics or geography, was the main reason their lines were drawn the way they were.
The decision reinforces limits on how far states can go in using race when they draw voting districts, even when they say they are trying to comply with the Voting Rights Act, and signals that oddly shaped, race-driven districts will draw close judicial scrutiny.
How it got here: A three-judge federal district court in Texas ruled the three districts unconstitutional; the state, private intervenors, and the federal government appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
The Case in Depth
What happened
After the 1990 census gave Texas three new congressional seats, the state legislature created two new majority-minority districts and reconfigured a third in the Dallas and Houston areas, aiming partly to satisfy the federal Voting Rights Act. Six Texas voters sued, claiming the resulting oddly shaped districts amounted to unconstitutional racial gerrymanders that used race as the dominant factor in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee.
The question before the Court
Could Texas draw three new congressional districts mostly around race, even though it said it was just trying to follow the Voting Rights Act?
Why it matters
Texas had to redraw Districts 18, 29, and 30 before further elections could proceed under them, and other states drawing majority-minority districts to satisfy the Voting Rights Act now face a stricter test for how compact and race-neutral those districts must be, increasing the odds of future lawsuits over district lines.
What changes now
The district court's decision striking down the three districts stands, meaning Texas had to redraw District 18, 29, and 30 using less race-driven methods for future elections. The ruling does not ban majority-minority districts outright, but it requires states seeking to comply with the Voting Rights Act to keep such districts reasonably compact and avoid using race as a substitute for political data, leaving states to navigate this balance in future redistricting cycles.
What this does not decide
The Court did not hold that creating majority-minority districts is always unconstitutional, nor did it require states to draw the most compact district possible. It left open exactly how much racial consideration is permissible when a state has a strong basis for believing the Voting Rights Act requires a majority-minority district.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor wrote separately to state more firmly than the plurality opinion that complying with the Voting Rights Act's results test is a compelling state interest, not merely an assumption. She laid out a five-part framework for when race-conscious districting is permissible, emphasizing that states may create majority-minority districts so long as they don't let race override traditional districting principles.
Concurrence — Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy joined the plurality but wrote to clarify that its statements about strict scrutiny not always applying to intentionally created majority-minority districts were unnecessary dicta, since strict scrutiny clearly applied here. He also disagreed with Justice O'Connor's suggestion that courts should conduct a second predominant-factor inquiry at the narrow-tailoring stage.
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, argued strict scrutiny should apply automatically whenever a state intentionally creates a majority-minority district, regardless of how compact it is. He would not require any additional showing of bizarre shape or subordination of traditional principles, viewing any deliberate race-based district creation as inherently triggering the strictest constitutional review.
Dissent — Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, argued the Court misapplied its own test by ignoring the complex mix of political and geographic factors, especially incumbency protection, that actually drove the district shapes. He contended Texas's map was a political gerrymander, not a racial one, and that even under strict scrutiny the districts were narrowly tailored to satisfy the Voting Rights Act.
Dissent — Justice Souter
“It would be sheer fantasy to assume that consideration of race in these circumstances is somehow separable from application of the traditional principle of incumbency protection”Souter's argument that race and traditional districting factors cannot be meaningfully untangled.
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, argued the entire Shaw line of cases rests on an unworkable and incoherent legal standard that fails to identify any real equal-protection injury and cannot be separated from legitimate traditional districting principles like protecting communities of interest and incumbents. He would essentially abandon the 'predominant factor' test as unmanageable.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied strict scrutiny, the toughest constitutional test, whenever race is the 'predominant factor' behind a district's lines, meaning race-neutral principles like compactness and incumbency protection were pushed aside in favor of race.
- Reviewing the trial record, the Court found that Texas had substantially ignored traditional districting criteria, had committed early on to creating majority-minority districts, and had used unprecedented block-by-block racial data to draw the lines, all of which supported applying strict scrutiny.
- The Court acknowledged that incumbency protection also played a real role, but concluded that where race was used as a stand-in for predicting voters' political leanings, that use of race itself triggered strict scrutiny, separate from any political motive.
- Turning to whether the districts could survive strict scrutiny, the Court assumed without deciding that avoiding liability under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (a law protecting minority voters' opportunity to elect their preferred candidates) can count as a compelling government interest.
- The Court held that even assuming that compelling interest, the districts were not 'narrowly tailored' because they were far more irregular and race-driven than reasonably necessary to avoid a Voting Rights Act violation, so they failed the second half of the strict-scrutiny test.
- Because Texas could not show its extreme departures from compact, race-neutral districting were reasonably necessary, the Court concluded the three districts amounted to unconstitutional racial gerrymanders.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Shaw v. Reno (509 U.S. 630)
The Court relied on and applied Shaw I's strict scrutiny framework for racial gerrymandering claims.
Reaffirms Miller v. Johnson (515 U.S. 900)
The Court applied and clarified Miller's 'predominant factor' test for when race triggers strict scrutiny.
Distinguishes DeWitt v. Wilson (515 U.S. 1170)
The Court said its summary affirmance in DeWitt did not exempt intentional race-based redistricting from strict scrutiny.