Morgan v. Illinois
The Supreme Court ruled that a defendant facing the death penalty has the right to ask potential jurors, on request, whether they would automatically vote for death if he were convicted — a trial judge cannot refuse that question.
The decision means capital defendants can weed out jurors who have already made up their minds about the punishment before hearing any evidence, closing off a gap left by earlier rulings that only addressed jurors automatically opposed to the death penalty.
“A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do.”
The core holding explaining why an automatic-death juror is not impartial.
How it got here: The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Morgan's conviction and death sentence; the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case due to disagreement among state courts on the issue.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Derrick Morgan was convicted of first-degree murder in Illinois for shooting a drug dealer six times as a paid hit for $4,000, and a jury sentenced him to death. During jury selection, the trial judge asked jurors whether they would automatically vote against the death penalty, but refused the defense's request to ask whether jurors would automatically vote for death upon a guilty verdict.
The question before the Court
Can a judge running jury selection in a death penalty case refuse to ask whether a juror would automatically vote for death after a guilty verdict?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that a capital defendant is entitled, upon request, to have the trial judge ask potential jurors whether they would automatically vote to impose the death penalty if he were found guilty. The Due Process Clause requires an impartial sentencing jury, and a juror committed in advance to voting for death regardless of the evidence cannot fairly weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors the law requires jurors to consider.
General questions about being 'fair' or willing to 'follow the law' aren't good enough, because a juror could sincerely believe such dogmatic views are fair while still holding a disqualifying bias. Since the trial court refused the specific question here, the Court could not be sure Morgan's jury was properly screened, so his death sentence was reversed and the case returned for further proceedings.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Capital defendants across the country now have a clearer right to specifically ask jurors during jury selection whether they would impose death no matter what the facts show, rather than relying on generic 'can you be fair' questions. This affects how trial courts in death-penalty states must structure jury selection going forward, and could require new trials where such questioning was denied.
What changes now
The case is sent back for further proceedings consistent with the Court's ruling, meaning Morgan is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding with adequate jury questioning about automatic imposition of the death penalty. The ruling does not affect the validity of his underlying murder conviction. Other states whose practices resembled Illinois's may need to adjust their capital voir dire procedures to comply with this decision.
What this does not decide
The Court made clear this ruling does not affect Morgan's underlying murder conviction, only his death sentence. It also does not require states to use jury sentencing in the first place, and does not address whether jurors merely inclined toward death, as opposed to automatically committed to it, must also be questioned.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Scalia
“Not only must mercy be allowed, but now only the merciful may be permitted to sit in judgment.”Scalia's central objection that the majority's rule excludes jurors who favor the death penalty.
Justice Scalia argued that a juror's personal view that death is always appropriate for capital murder does not make that juror partial, any more than a juror who would always convict given certain proven facts. He contended Illinois law does not require jurors to find any mitigating evidence, only to consider it, so a juror who finds nothing mitigating is not violating instructions. He would not require trial courts to ask a specific 'reverse-Witherspoon' question, viewing general fairness questions as adequate, and accused the majority of favoring only 'merciful' jurors in violation of the people's right to set capital punishment policy.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court explained that even though the Constitution doesn't require jury sentencing in capital cases, once a state chooses to use a jury for sentencing, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that jury to be impartial, just as the Sixth Amendment requires for a guilt-phase jury.
- Applying its earlier test for juror bias in death-penalty cases — whether a juror's views would prevent or substantially impair following the instructions and oath — the Court held that a juror who would automatically vote for death regardless of the facts is not impartial and can be removed for cause.
- The Court reasoned that such a juror has effectively already decided the case before hearing any evidence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, making that evidence irrelevant to the juror's decision, which conflicts with the requirement that jurors weigh both types of evidence.
- Because a defendant cannot exercise his right to remove such biased jurors unless he can identify them, the Court concluded that due process requires trial courts, on request, to allow specific questioning to uncover jurors who would automatically impose death.
- The Court found that the trial court's general 'can you be fair' and 'will you follow instructions' questions were not sufficient, because a juror who is secretly committed to always imposing death could answer those general questions honestly while still holding disqualifying views.
- Since it could not be certain that no such juror sat on Morgan's sentencing jury, the Court concluded the voir dire was constitutionally inadequate and his death sentence could not stand.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Ross v. Oklahoma (487 U.S. 81)
The Court relied on Ross's statement that seating even one automatically pro-death juror would require overturning a death sentence.
Distinguishes Witherspoon v. Illinois (391 U.S. 510)
The Court applied Witherspoon's logic in reverse, to jurors automatically favoring rather than opposing the death penalty.