McCormick v. United States
The Supreme Court threw out a West Virginia legislator's extortion conviction, ruling that a jury cannot convict an elected official of extortion for accepting a campaign contribution unless the payment was made in exchange for an explicit promise to perform or not perform an official act.
The decision sets a clear line between ordinary political fundraising -- where donors often expect a sympathetic lawmaker to act in their favor -- and criminal extortion, and it found that the jury here was never asked to decide the case using that standard.
“The receipt of such contributions is also vulnerable under the Act as having been taken under color of official right, but only if the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.”
The Court's core new rule requiring an explicit exchange to convict an elected official of extortion.
How it got here: A federal jury convicted McCormick of one extortion count and the tax count; the Fourth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted review due to a circuit split over the Hobbs Act's "color of official right" language.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Robert McCormick, a West Virginia state legislator, championed legislation letting foreign-trained doctors practicing under temporary permits become permanently licensed. During his re-election campaign, he told the doctors' lobbyist he needed money and had not heard from the doctors; he then received several cash payments that were never reported as campaign contributions or as income. He was later indicted for extortion and tax fraud.
The question before the Court
Could a state legislator be convicted of extortion under the Hobbs Act for accepting cash from people who wanted him to keep supporting their legislation, without proof he explicitly promised to act in return?
Why it matters
Elected officials who raise money from people affected by pending legislation will not automatically face federal extortion charges just because a donor hoped for favorable treatment. Prosecutors pursuing corruption cases involving campaign contributions must now prove an explicit exchange -- money for a specific official act -- making these cases harder to bring but protecting routine campaign fundraising from criminal exposure.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower courts for further proceedings. The extortion conviction cannot stand because the jury was never asked whether McCormick received the payment in exchange for an explicit promise to act, and a new trial would be needed on that count. The tax conviction must also be reconsidered independently, since the appeals court based it solely on the now-invalid extortion finding rather than on the jury's actual instructions on that separate charge.
What this does not decide
The Court expressly limited its holding to campaign contributions, saying it does not decide whether an explicit quid-pro-quo requirement applies when an elected official instead receives gifts, meals, or travel expenses. It also left open a separate, unresolved circuit split over whether the Hobbs Act requires proof the official personally induced the payment.
Concurrences and dissents
How the Justices voted
Majority (1). Justice White (author).
Separate writings (1). Justice Scalia (author of a concurrence).
Dissent (1). Justice Stevens (author).
Concurrence — Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia agreed with the outcome and the Court's reasoning given the assumptions both sides argued from, but wrote separately to flag that the entire premise -- that 'under color of official right' covers payments for official duties at all -- might be wrong. He suggested the phrase may instead require a false claim of legal entitlement to the money, which would make the Court's new distinction unnecessary, though he declined to decide that unbriefed question. Read the full concurrence →
Dissent — Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens argued the jury instructions, read as a whole, adequately distinguished legitimate contributions from extorted payments and already captured an implicit quid-pro-quo requirement, which he found sufficient since extortion need not be committed in writing or through explicit words. He also faulted McCormick for never objecting to the specific instructions at trial, arguing the Court had no basis to reverse a conviction based on jury instructions the defendant himself had helped shape and never challenged below. Read the full dissent →
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first found that the appeals court had affirmed the conviction using its own legal and factual conclusions -- including that the payments were never meant as campaign contributions -- that were never actually put to the jury, even though such questions of intent must be decided by a jury, not an appellate court.
- The Court then addressed how to distinguish a legal campaign contribution from an illegal extortion payment when an elected official is involved, agreeing that the parties' intent matters but rejecting the appeals court's looser approach of asking only whether the payment was 'never intended' as a real contribution.
- The Court reasoned that lawmakers routinely support legislation that benefits people who also happen to donate to their campaigns, and treating that ordinary overlap as criminal extortion would criminalize a basic and unavoidable feature of privately financed elections.
- The Court held that a campaign contribution to an elected official can only count as extortion under the Hobbs Act if it was made in exchange for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not perform a specific official act -- an explicit quid pro quo.
- Applying that standard, the Court found the jury instructions allowed a guilty verdict based merely on an unspoken expectation of favorable treatment, so it could not be sure the jury had actually found the explicit exchange the law now requires.
- The Court further concluded that the tax conviction could not be upheld on the theory that the extortion verdict proved the payment was not a real campaign contribution, because the jury could have convicted on the tax charge even while believing the money was a contribution.