Parker v. Arkansas

1990-10-01

Headline: Denies review of Arkansas ruling that allowed a death-row retrial after a prior conviction was reversed, leaving the state's reprosecution intact despite a Justice’s double jeopardy warning.

Holding: The petition for review was denied; the Court left Arkansas’s decision allowing a second capital trial in place, while Justice Marshall dissented arguing double jeopardy barred retrial.

Real World Impact:

Leaves Arkansas retrial and death sentence intact after reversal.
Allows defendants to face a new capital trial following an overturned conviction.
Maintains prosecutors’ ability to retry under a different murder statute.

Topics: double jeopardy, death penalty, retrial rules, criminal appeals

Summary

Background

William Frank Parker was tried twice and sentenced to death for killing James and Sandra Warren. The first conviction was for felony murder based on a burglary theory. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed that conviction, saying the State had not proved the killings occurred "in the course of and in furtherance of" the burglary. The State then retried Parker under a different capital murder provision and won a second conviction and death sentence.

Reasoning

The central question raised by Parker’s petition was whether reversing a conviction because the evidence failed to prove an essential element prevents the State from trying the defendant again under a different criminal statute. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the Arkansas decision, leaving the state court’s view in place. Justice Marshall dissented, arguing that established double jeopardy principles bar reprosecution when an appellate court finds insufficient evidence, and he would have granted review and vacated the death sentence.

Real world impact

By denying review, the Supreme Court left in place an Arkansas ruling that permitted retrial and a death sentence after a prior conviction was overturned for lack of proof on an essential element. That outcome affects defendants facing retrial after reversal and leaves unresolved whether reprosecution under a different statute is consistent with the protection against being tried twice for the same offense. The denial does not settle the broader national rule.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice Marshall’s dissent explains the dispute: he says the Arkansas court misapplied precedent and would bar a second trial when the evidence proved insufficient the first time.