OCTOBER TERM 1989 · DECIDED MARCH 5, 1990 · 7–2

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Maryland v. Buie

Vacated and remandedFinal ruling
police searchesFourth Amendmenthome arrestscriminal procedure

Opinion of the Court by Justice White

The Court ruled that police making an in-home arrest can conduct a limited safety sweep of the rest of the house without a warrant or probable cause, as long as they have a reasonable, fact-based suspicion that someone dangerous might be hiding there.

The decision extends the reasoning of Terry v. Ohio's street-frisk rule into private homes, giving officers more leeway to check nearby rooms during an arrest, but it sends the case back so a lower court can decide whether that suspicion actually existed here.

there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene
Justice White

The core standard the Court adopts for when police may sweep other rooms during a home arrest.

How it got here: A Maryland trial court denied Buie's motion to suppress; an intermediate appeals court affirmed, but Maryland's highest court reversed, requiring probable cause for such sweeps.

The Case in Depth

What happened

Police arrested Jerome Buie in his home on an armed robbery warrant after he emerged from his basement. After handcuffing him, a second officer went down into the basement "in case there was someone else" there and saw a red running suit matching the robbery description in plain view, which was later used as evidence against Buie at trial.

The question before the Court

When police arrest someone in his home, can they search other rooms for hidden accomplices without probable cause, based only on reasonable suspicion of danger?

The Court's answer

Partly — the Court ruled that police may conduct a brief, protective sweep of a home during an arrest, but the level of justification needed depends on where they look. Officers can automatically check closets and spaces right next to the arrest spot with no suspicion required at all, since an attacker could strike from there immediately. For any other rooms, though, officers need specific, articulable facts — not just a hunch — suggesting someone dangerous is hiding there.

Because Maryland's highest court had instead demanded full probable cause for any such sweep, the Court found that standard too strict and sent the case back so the state court could decide, under the correct reasonable-suspicion test, whether the search of Buie's basement was actually justified.

Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →

Why it matters

Police officers now have clearer authority to check other rooms of a house for hidden, dangerous people while making an arrest, without first getting a warrant or meeting the tougher probable-cause standard. Homeowners and suspects retain some privacy protection, since sweeps must be based on real facts pointing to danger and must be brief and limited to places a person could hide.

What changes now

The case goes back to Maryland's highest court, which must decide, applying the new reasonable-suspicion standard, whether the officer who entered Buie's basement actually had specific facts suggesting someone dangerous was down there. If not, the running suit evidence may still be suppressed and Buie's conviction could be affected. This is a final ruling on the legal standard, not a resolution of the underlying suppression question.

What this does not decide

The Court did not decide whether the officers in this specific case actually had enough suspicion to justify entering the basement — it sent that fact-specific question back to the Maryland courts. It also did not authorize full, top-to-bottom home searches, only brief, targeted checks of places a person could be hiding.

Concurrences and dissents

How the Justices voted

Majority (1). Justice White (author).

Separate writings (2). Justice Stevens (author of a concurrence).

Dissent (1). Justice Brennan (author).

Concurrence — Justice Stevens

Justice Stevens agreed with the reasonable-suspicion standard but stressed it applies only to genuinely protective sweeps, not evidence-gathering. He pointed to facts suggesting the officers may not have actually feared danger — including that the arresting officer said he wasn't worried and that Buie offered no resistance — and suggested the State may have a hard time justifying the search on remand. Read the full concurrence

Concurrence — Justice Kennedy

Justice Kennedy wrote separately to push back on Justice Stevens's suggestion that the State faces a tough task on remand, saying he believed the officers' conduct matched standard, reasonable police safety practice and wanted to avoid his colleague's view being read as authoritative guidance. Read the full concurrence

Dissent — Justice Brennan

I firmly believe that police officers must have probable cause to fear that their personal safety is threatened by a hidden confederate of an arrestee before they may sweep through the entire home.Brennan's central objection that the majority's lower standard is too permissive for home searches.

Justice Brennan argued the majority wrongly extended Terry's street-frisk logic into the home, understating how intrusive a sweep of a house really is compared to a brief pat-down. He would have required probable cause to believe a hidden, dangerous confederate was present before allowing any sweep, and would have upheld suppression of the evidence. Read the full dissent

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court applied the balancing approach from Terry v. Ohio, the 1968 case allowing a limited pat-down of a suspect for weapons based on specific, articulable facts rather than full probable cause, weighing officer safety against the intrusion on privacy.
  2. It reasoned that officers arresting someone inside a home face a comparable, and possibly greater, risk of ambush from unseen third parties than officers making a street stop, because the home is unfamiliar 'turf' with hidden spaces.
  3. The Court held that officers may automatically check closets and spaces immediately next to the arrest location without any suspicion at all, since an attack could be launched from there instantly.
  4. For any further rooms beyond that immediate area, the Court required specific, articulable facts that would lead a reasonable officer to believe someone dangerous was hiding there before conducting a sweep.
  5. The Court distinguished this narrow, protective sweep from the full home search barred in Chimel v. California, explaining that a sweep is only a quick visual check for people, not a search for evidence, and must last no longer than needed to secure the arrest scene.
  6. Applying this framework, the Court found that Maryland's top court had used too strict a probable-cause standard rather than this reasonable-suspicion test.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

Fourth Amendment

Constitutional protection against unreasonable government searches and seizures, including of homes.

Cases affected by this decision

Reaffirms Terry v. Ohio (392 U. S. 1)

The Court relies on and extends Terry's reasonable-suspicion balancing test from street stops to in-home arrests.

Distinguishes Chimel v. California (395 U. S. 752)

The Court says Chimel's limits on full home searches don't control because a protective sweep is far narrower.

Distinguishes Michigan v. Summers (452 U. S. 692)

The Court rejects the State's comparison, saying a search-warrant case doesn't mirror an arrest-warrant sweep.

Distinguishes Pennsylvania v. Mimms (434 U. S. 106)

The Court says ordering a driver out of a car was a much smaller intrusion than a home sweep.

Reaffirms Ybarra v. Illinois (444 U. S. 85)

The Court treats this case, requiring individualized suspicion to frisk bystanders, as analogous support for its rule.

Supreme Court Opinion

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Maryland v. Buie | SCOTUS Reporter