Will v. Michigan Department of State Police
The Supreme Court ruled that neither a state government nor a state official sued in his or her official capacity counts as a "person" who can be sued for damages under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The decision closes off a route some civil rights plaintiffs had used to sue states directly in state court, even though the Eleventh Amendment's limits on federal-court suits against states did not apply there, and it prompted two forceful dissents defending a broader reading of the statute.
“We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under § 1983.”
The Court's core holding on who can be sued for damages under the civil rights statute.
How it got here: Michigan trial courts ruled for the employee; the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court held the state and its department were not \"persons\" under § 1983, and the employee sought Supreme Court review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
A Michigan state police employee, Ray Will, claimed he was denied a promotion because his brother had been a student activist tracked in a police "red squad" file. He sued the Michigan Department of State Police and its Director in Michigan state court, arguing this violated his constitutional rights and gave him a claim under the federal civil rights statute, Section 1983.
The question before the Court
Can a state government, or a state official sued in his official capacity, be sued for money damages as a "person" under the federal civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
Why it matters
People who believe a state agency violated their constitutional rights cannot use Section 1983 to collect money damages directly from the state itself, whether they sue in state or federal court. They must instead sue individual officials, who may have personal defenses, or rely on other legal theories, narrowing one avenue for holding state governments financially accountable.
What changes now
This is a final merits decision resolving the statutory question of who can be sued under Section 1983. The judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court, which had already dismissed the claims against the state agency and remanded questions about the Director's individual immunity, is affirmed. Future Section 1983 damages suits against states or officials in their official capacities will be barred nationwide, though suits against officials for injunctive relief or against officials personally for damages remain available.
What this does not decide
The Court's opinion does not disturb the rule that state officials sued in their official capacity for forward-looking injunctive relief remain "persons" who can be sued under Section 1983. It also does not affect Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, which held that municipalities and other local governments not treated as arms of the state can still be sued for damages.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Brennan
Justice Brennan argued the majority smuggled Eleventh Amendment reasoning into a case where that Amendment does not even apply, since the suit was filed in state court. He contended that a careful reading of Section 1983's text, the 1871 Dictionary Act's definition of "person" to include "bodies politic and corporate," and the statute's Reconstruction-era history all show Congress meant states to be persons subject to suit. He would have reversed and remanded to consider Michigan's own immunity defenses.
Dissent — Justice Stevens
“The doctrine of sovereign immunity rests on the fictional premise that the "King can do no wrong."”Stevens's argument that the majority revived an outdated fiction to shield states from liability.
Justice Stevens argued the majority's position is inconsistent with decades of decisions treating official-capacity suits as suits against the state itself for purposes of awarding injunctions and attorney's fees against state treasuries. He reasoned that if the state is the real party in interest for those purposes, logic requires calling the state a "person" for damages purposes too, and criticized the majority for reviving fictions borrowed from royal sovereign-immunity doctrine.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied the ordinary rule that the word "person" in a statute usually excludes the government itself unless Congress clearly says otherwise, reasoning that Congress would have written an awkward sentence if it meant to include states as "persons" subject to suit under Section 1983.
- The Court invoked a heightened-clarity principle used when a law might upset the usual balance of power between states and the federal government, holding that Congress must speak with unmistakable clarity before courts will read a statute to expose states to new liability.
- Examining the purpose behind the 1871 Civil Rights Act, the Court reasoned that Congress mainly wanted to give people a federal court forum for civil rights claims, and since the Eleventh Amendment already barred federal-court damages suits against states, reading "person" to include states in state court would not fit that federal-forum purpose.
- The Court concluded that Congress did not intend Section 1983 to override the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity, which lets a state avoid being sued without its consent, and found nothing in the statute's history clearly overriding that immunity.
- Extending this logic to individual officials, the Court reasoned that a lawsuit against a state official acting in his official capacity for money damages is really a lawsuit against the state's office itself, so such officials are likewise not "persons" subject to damages liability under Section 1983, though they remain suable for forward-looking injunctive relief.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Quern v. Jordan (440 U.S. 332)
The Court leaned on Quern's holding that Section 1983 does not override states' Eleventh Amendment immunity as support for its result.
Distinguishes Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (436 U.S. 658)
The Court said its ruling that states are not persons does not cast doubt on Monell's holding that municipalities are persons under § 1983.