McQuillen v. Wisconsin Education Association Council Et Al.

1988-06-20

Headline: Court leaves unresolved whether Title VII requires 'but-for' causation, denying review and leaving the Seventh Circuit’s stricter causation rule and conflicting appeals-court standards in place.

Holding: The petition for a writ of certiorari was denied; the Court refused to review the Seventh Circuit’s decision and did not resolve the circuit split over Title VII causation.

Real World Impact:

Leaves conflicting standards among federal appeals courts unresolved.
Keeps the Seventh Circuit’s 'but for' rule in this case.
Creates continued uncertainty for employees and employers about proof needed.

Topics: workplace discrimination, Title VII, causation standard, employment law

Summary

Background

An individual, Gordon E. McQuillen, sued the Wisconsin Education Association Council, raising a workplace discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff must prove the employer’s unlawful motive was the "but for" or determining cause of the adverse job decision. Other federal appeals courts have reached different results on how strong the proof of motive must be.

Reasoning

The central question was whether Title VII requires that discriminatory intent be the "but for" cause of an employment decision, meaning the employee would have received the job but for the unlawful motive. The Seventh Circuit supported the stricter "but for" standard by pointing to Title VII’s language prohibiting discrimination "because of" a protected trait. By contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Bibbs said a plaintiff can win by showing the unlawful motive "played some part" in the decision, and other circuits require a "significant" or "substantial" factor.

Real world impact

The Supreme Court denied the petition for review and did not resolve the split among the federal appeals courts. That means different courts may continue to require different levels of proof in discrimination cases. The denial is not a decision on the merits and does not prevent the issue from being decided in a future case.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice White dissented from the denial and would have granted review because of the clear disagreement among the circuits about the correct causation standard.