Brecheen v. Oklahoma

1988-02-29

Headline: Denial of review leaves Oklahoma death sentence intact despite concerns about biased local jury and the state's high clear-and-convincing standard for venue changes affecting capital sentencing.

Holding: The Court denied review and left the Oklahoma conviction and death sentence in place, rejecting a call to examine whether the State's strict venue-change rule and juror ties prevented a fair capital sentencing.

Real World Impact:

Leaves the Oklahoma conviction and death sentence in place.
Allows the State's high clear-and-convincing venue standard to go unreviewed.
Fails to settle when juror ties to victims can presumptively bar death sentences.

Topics: change of venue, jury impartiality, death penalty, pretrial publicity, capital sentencing

Summary

Background

On March 23, 1983, Marie Stubbs was shot and killed in her Ardmore, Oklahoma home. The police arrested Robert Brecheen, and the case drew extensive local newspaper and television coverage. Ardmore has about 25,000 people; Carter County about 40,000. Brecheen’s lawyer filed an unopposed motion to move the trial out of Carter County. The trial judge denied the motion after questioning jurors. The jury included people who knew the victim or her family, were customers at the victim’s store, or knew the prosecutor and police. The jury convicted Brecheen of burglary and homicide and sentenced him to death.

Reasoning

Justice Marshall explains that the core issue is whether Oklahoma’s high clear-and-convincing standard for change of venue violates due process by making fair trials unlikely in heavily publicized cases. He notes past decisions that require impartial juries and that a refusal to move venue can presumptively show prejudice. He argues most States use lower standards, while Oklahoma requires proof that a fair trial is a “virtual impossibility,” which Marshall says is inconsistent with precedent protecting fair trials.

Real world impact

Marshall warns that leaving Oklahoma’s rule unexamined risks letting juries with personal ties or victims’ supporters decide death sentences. He stresses that the sentencing phase of a capital trial is different from the guilt phase: jurors who know the victim may be inflamed when deciding whether to impose death. Marshall urges the Court to review and set rules about state venue standards and when prejudice should be presumed during capital sentencing. Because the Court denied review, those questions remain unresolved.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented from the denial of review and urged the Court to take the case to resolve these constitutional questions.