OCTOBER TERM 1986 · DECIDED SEPTEMBER 21, 1987 · 5–4

482 U.S. 496 · No. 86-5020 · Argued March 24, 1987

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Booth v. Maryland

VacatedFinal ruling
death penaltyvictim impact statementscapital sentencingEighth Amendmentcriminal justice

Opinion of the Court by Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens

The Supreme Court ruled that juries deciding whether to impose the death penalty cannot be shown a victim impact statement describing the victims' personal qualities and the emotional toll on their family, because that information has nothing to do with the defendant's own blameworthiness.

The 5-4 decision struck down part of a Maryland law requiring such statements in capital sentencing hearings, finding that letting juries weigh a family's grief and opinions about the killer creates too great a risk that the death sentence will be handed out arbitrarily.

This evidence thus could divert the jury's attention away from the defendant's background and record, and the circumstances of the crime.
Justice Powell

Explaining why victim impact evidence risks distracting the jury from the defendant's own culpability.

How it got here: A Maryland jury sentenced Booth to death; the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed on automatic review; the Supreme Court agreed to hear his Eighth Amendment challenge to the victim impact statement.

The Case in Depth

What happened

John Booth and an accomplice robbed and murdered an elderly couple, Irvin and Rose Bronstein, in their Baltimore home to get money for heroin. At Booth's capital sentencing hearing, Maryland law required a victim impact statement describing the crime's effect on the Bronsteins' family, drawn from interviews with their children and granddaughter, detailing their grief, praise for the victims, and views on the killer.

The question before the Court

Could a jury deciding whether to sentence a murderer to death be shown a statement describing how the victims' family suffered emotionally from the crime?

The Court's answer

No — the Court ruled that a capital sentencing jury cannot be given a victim impact statement describing the victim's personal qualities and the emotional suffering of the family, because that information generally has no bearing on the defendant's personal responsibility or moral guilt. The Court reasoned that a death sentence must rest on the individual defendant's character, record, and the circumstances of the crime, not on how eloquently a grieving family can describe its loss or on how well-liked the victim was.

The Court also held that letting family members offer their own opinions about the crime and the defendant — such as whether he could ever be rehabilitated — risks inflaming the jury and diverting it from a reasoned decision. Because Maryland's statute required this information in capital cases, the Court found the law unconstitutional to that extent and vacated the death sentence, sending the case back for further proceedings.

Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →

Why it matters

Maryland and other states could no longer put victims' family members' grief, praise for the victim, or opinions about the defendant before a capital sentencing jury. Prosecutors had to rework how they presented the human cost of a murder in death penalty cases, and defense lawyers gained a new tool to object to emotionally charged sentencing evidence.

What changes now

Booth's death sentence was vacated, and the case returned to Maryland courts for further proceedings without the improperly admitted victim impact statement; his underlying convictions were unaffected. The ruling required Maryland, and other states with similar laws, to stop using victim impact statements describing personal characteristics or family opinions at the sentencing phase of capital cases, though the Court expressly left open whether such statements could still be used in noncapital cases.

What this does not decide

The Court expressly limited its holding to the sentencing phase of capital cases, stating it implied no opinion about victim impact statements in noncapital cases. It also left room for victim-related evidence directly tied to the circumstances of the crime or offered to rebut a defendant's own arguments.

Concurrences and dissents

Dissent — Justice White

many if not most persons would also agree, for example, that someone who drove his car recklessly through a stoplight and unintentionally killed a pedestrian merits significantly more punishment than someone who drove his car recklessly through the same stoplight at a time when no pedestrian was there to be hit.White's argument that the harm a crime causes can properly affect punishment.

Justice White argued that the harm a murder causes a victim's family does bear on a defendant's responsibility, comparing it to how the law already punishes people more severely for causing actual harm than for merely risking it. He would have deferred to Maryland's legislative judgment that victim impact statements help juries weigh the true harm of a crime, and found the majority's concerns about jury inflammation speculative on this record.

Dissent — Justice Scalia

Justice Scalia argued that the amount of harm a defendant causes has always been relevant to punishment, including in death penalty cases, pointing to Tison v. Arizona as an example where the degree of harm caused, not moral guilt alone, determined death eligibility. He viewed the majority's rule as one-sided, letting defendants present all mitigating evidence of their suffering while barring the state from showing the human suffering the crime caused.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court applied its settled rule that a capital sentencing jury's discretion must be channeled to avoid arbitrary and capricious death sentences, requiring an individualized decision based on the defendant's character, record, and the circumstances of the crime, and on evidence bearing on the defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt.
  2. The Court identified two kinds of information in the victim impact statement: descriptions of the victims' personal qualities and the family's emotional suffering, and the family's own opinions and characterizations of the crime and the defendant.
  3. As to the first category, the Court reasoned that this information focuses on the victim and family rather than the defendant, and that a defendant often has no knowledge of his victim's family or how they will react, so the harm described is frequently unrelated to his blameworthiness.
  4. The Court found that allowing juries to weigh how articulately a family expresses its grief, or how sympathetic the victim was perceived to be, injects an arbitrary factor into the life-or-death decision, since some families are simply more capable of expressing loss than others regardless of its severity.
  5. The Court also concluded that such evidence is difficult for a defendant to rebut without shifting the sentencing hearing into a distracting 'mini-trial' over the victim's character.
  6. As to the second category, the Court reasoned that admitting the family's emotionally charged opinions about the crime and the defendant serves only to inflame the jury rather than support the reasoned, dispassionate decisionmaking capital sentencing requires.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

Eighth Amendment

Bars cruel and unusual punishment, including death sentences imposed arbitrarily or capriciously.

Md. Ann. Code, Art. 41, § 4-609(c)

Maryland law requiring victim impact statements in presentence reports, including in capital cases.

Cases affected by this decision

Reaffirms Zant v. Stephens (462 U.S. 862)

The Court relies on Zant's rule that death sentences cannot rest on irrelevant or impermissible considerations.

Reaffirms Woodson v. North Carolina (428 U.S. 280)

The Court reaffirms Woodson's principle that death is a punishment different from all others, requiring individualized sentencing.

Supreme Court Opinion

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Booth v. Maryland | SCOTUS Reporter