Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc.
Headline: Federal courts limited from ordering losing parties to pay more than $30/day for private expert witnesses; the Court enforced the statutory cap and allowed excess only with contract, statute, or court appointment.
Holding: The Court held that when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for fees paid to its own expert witnesses, federal courts are bound by the $30-per-day limit in 28 U.S.C. §1821(b) unless explicit statutory or contractual authority allows otherwise.
- Prevents prevailing parties from recovering private expert fees above $30/day without statute or contract.
- Makes winning litigants bear more of expert costs or seek contractual/statutory authorization.
- Limits courts’ discretion, affecting civil, antitrust, and discrimination cases nationwide.
Summary
Background
A few companies and a labor union took different cases through federal court. In one antitrust suit a company won and sought to recover large expert fees from the loser. In a separate discrimination case a prevailing company likewise asked to be reimbursed for expert witness costs above standard rates. The trial courts and the Fifth Circuit split over whether judges could award expert fees above the usual witness rate.
Reasoning
The Court addressed whether judges may use their general cost‑awarding power to require losers to pay more than the standard $30 per day set by a federal law. The majority said Congress has already set detailed rules about which costs can be taxed and how much witnesses are paid. The federal cost statute and witness fee law limit reimbursement for a party’s own expert witnesses, unless a contract or a specific statute says otherwise or the expert was appointed by the court. The Court therefore affirmed that judges cannot ignore the statutory $30/day cap when taxing private expert fees.
Real world impact
After this decision, winning parties generally cannot recover large private expert bills from losers unless there is clear statutory or contractual authority or the expert was court‑appointed. District courts lose the ability to routinely award above‑statutory expert fees, and prevailing litigants must rely on contracts, statutes, or different remedies to recoup big expert expenses.
Dissents or concurrances
Justice Blackmun agreed but noted the opinion does not decide whether a different federal law (42 U.S.C. §1988) allows expert fees. Justice Marshall (joined by Justice Brennan) dissented, arguing judges retained broader discretion under the rules to award nonstatutory costs.
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