First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles
The Supreme Court ruled that when a land-use regulation denies a property owner all use of their land, the government must pay compensation for the period the regulation was in effect, even if the regulation is later invalidated or withdrawn.
The decision rejects California's rule that a landowner's only remedy for such a regulation is to have it declared invalid going forward, with no compensation for the time it was enforced -- meaning local governments nationwide can now face damages claims for the entire period an invalid land-use restriction was in place.
“We merely hold that where the government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.”
The Court's core holding that compensation is owed for the period a total-use-denying regulation was in effect.
How it got here: California trial and appellate courts struck the church's damage claim, following a state rule barring damages for temporary regulatory takings; the church appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Case in Depth
What happened
A church owned a 21-acre campground, Lutherglen, used as a retreat and recreation site for handicapped children. After a wildfire denuded nearby hills, a severe flood destroyed the camp's buildings. The county then passed an ordinance banning construction in the flood zone, which the church said denied it all use of its land. The church sued for damages but did not ask the court to invalidate the ordinance.
The question before the Court
If a court later strikes down a land-use rule that blocked all use of someone's property, must the government pay for the time the rule was in effect, even though it's no longer in force?
Why it matters
Property owners who lose all use of their land under a regulation later found unconstitutional can now sue for money damages covering the time the regulation was enforced, not just an order stopping it going forward. Local governments and land-use planners face new financial exposure and may become more cautious about enacting sweeping, immediately-effective restrictions.
What changes now
The case is sent back to the California courts, which must now decide the questions the Supreme Court left open: whether the ordinance actually denied the church all use of Lutherglen, and whether the county's safety justification might excuse it from paying compensation even if a taking occurred. The ruling itself is a final decision on the compensation-remedy question, though the underlying taking claim remains unresolved on remand.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the county's flood ordinance actually took all use of the church's property, or whether the county's health-and-safety justification might mean no compensable taking occurred at all. It also expressly did not address normal delays from ordinary permitting, zoning changes, or variance proceedings.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens argued the Court should have avoided the constitutional question because the complaint may not have even alleged a taking, and that the Court wrongly equated regulatory takings with physical takings, ignoring that regulatory takings require weighing the severity, scope, and duration of a restriction together. He also argued California's practice of only requiring invalidation, not damages, was a legitimate procedural choice the Court misread, and that the Due Process Clause, not the Takings Clause, should govern unfair or dilatory land-use procedures.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court read the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause as a self-executing guarantee: once government action amounts to a taking of property, the Constitution itself requires payment, regardless of whether a statute provides a damages remedy.
- The Court examined its precedents on temporary physical takings -- such as wartime occupation of buildings or leaseholds -- and found that compensation is required for the period property is taken even if the government later gives it back or abandons the intrusion.
- The Court reasoned that a regulation denying all use of property is no different in kind from these physical takings: if the regulation-caused deprivation amounted to a taking, the fact that the regulation is later invalidated or repealed does not erase the harm already suffered during the period it was enforced.
- The Court distinguished cases like Agins and Danforth, which involved only preliminary planning activity that reduced property value without denying all use, holding those cases stand only for the narrow point that valuation is measured as of the time of the taking, not that compensation can never be owed for a temporary total denial of use.
- Applying this reasoning to the complaint's allegation that the ordinance denied the church all use of Lutherglen, the Court concluded that if such a taking occurred, the county could not escape paying for the time period during which the total denial of use was in effect simply by later withdrawing or losing the ordinance in court.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Limits Agins v. Tiburon (447 U.S. 255)
The Court held Agins does not bar compensation for a temporary total denial of property use, narrowing its earlier reading.
Distinguishes Danforth v. United States (308 U.S. 271)
The Court said Danforth only addressed valuation timing, not whether temporary total-use denials can require compensation.