Lockhart v. McCree
Headline: Court allows states to remove prospective jurors who oppose the death penalty before the guilt phase, reversing a lower court and easing use of a single jury for guilt and sentencing in capital cases.
Holding: The Constitution does not prohibit removing for cause before the guilt phase prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair their sentencing duties.
- Allows states to exclude jurors who cannot consider the death penalty before guilt phase.
- Makes it harder to overturn convictions based on death‑qualification social‑science studies.
- Resolves conflicting federal appeals decisions on death‑qualification practice.
Summary
Background
Ardia McCree, an Arkansas man charged with capital felony murder, was tried by a jury after the trial judge removed for cause eight prospective jurors who said they could not under any circumstances vote for the death penalty. McCree was convicted and given life; he later challenged the practice in federal habeas proceedings, arguing that excluding death‑opponents biased the guilt determination. Lower courts relied on social‑science studies and granted relief, creating a split among federal appeals courts.
Reasoning
The Court examined the studies and the lower courts’ findings but concluded that even assuming those studies showed “death qualification” produced juries somewhat more prone to convict, the Constitution does not forbid states from excluding prospective jurors who could not perform their sentencing duties. The majority held the fair‑cross‑section rule does not require petit juries to mirror community opinion in this way and that constitutional impartiality means jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and follow instructions. The Court also emphasized state interests in a single jury for both guilt and penalty phases, including efficiency and the overlap of relevant evidence.
Real world impact
The decision permits states that use a unitary jury system to continue excluding prospective jurors who refuse to consider the death penalty, reduces the likelihood that convictions will be automatically overturned on this ground, and resolves conflicting federal appellate rulings. The Court criticized the social‑science record but held the practice constitutional.
Dissents or concurrances
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, dissented, arguing the empirical record shows death‑qualified juries are measurably more conviction‑prone, disproportionately exclude minorities, and therefore undermine fairness and reliable factfinding.
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