Batson v. Kentucky
The Court ruled that a prosecutor cannot use jury strikes to remove people because of their race, and that a defendant can raise this objection based solely on what happened in his own trial, without having to prove a pattern across many other cases.
The decision overturns the part of a 1965 ruling that had made it almost impossible for defendants to challenge racially motivated jury strikes, and it sets up a new process trial judges must use whenever a defendant raises the issue.
“the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant.”
The core holding limiting prosecutors' use of race-based peremptory strikes.
How it got here: The trial court denied a motion to discharge the all-white jury; the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, following Swain v. Alabama; the defendant sought Supreme Court review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
A Black man in Kentucky was charged with burglary and receiving stolen goods. During jury selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory strikes to remove all four Black people from the jury pool, leaving an all-white jury. Defense counsel objected, arguing this violated the defendant's right to an impartial jury drawn without regard to race, but the trial judge allowed the strikes and the jury convicted him.
The question before the Court
Could a prosecutor strike every Black juror from a Black defendant's trial and never have to explain why?
Why it matters
Criminal defendants nationwide gained a real tool to challenge all-white or racially skewed juries without having to dig up statistics from unrelated trials. Prosecutors now must be ready to give a race-neutral reason for striking jurors when challenged, and trial judges must evaluate those reasons, changing how jury selection is conducted in courtrooms across the country.
What changes now
The case goes back to the trial court, which must first decide whether the facts of this trial establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If they do, the prosecutor must offer a race-neutral reason for striking every Black juror; if no such explanation is given, the conviction must be reversed. This is a final merits ruling, but it launched years of follow-on litigation over how the new procedure should work in practice.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the Constitution limits a defendant's own use of peremptory strikes, did not specify exact procedures trial courts must follow, and expressed no view on whether the ruling applies retroactively to already-final convictions -- several separate opinions addressed retroactivity, but the majority did not.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice White
Justice White agreed Swain should be overruled to the extent it presumed prosecutors act legitimately, since Swain itself warned that a pattern of exclusion could rebut that presumption. He emphasized that using a strike against one or two Black jurors doesn't automatically violate the Constitution, and separately argued the new rule should not apply retroactively to already-completed trials.
Concurrence — Justice Marshall
Justice Marshall joined the Court's opinion but argued it did not go far enough. Drawing on data showing prosecutors routinely struck the vast majority of Black jurors, he argued that trial judges evaluating supposedly neutral explanations would struggle to detect conscious or unconscious racism, and that only eliminating peremptory challenges entirely could truly end the discrimination.
Concurrence — Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens explained why it was proper for the Court to decide the equal protection question even though the defendant's own briefs had focused on the Sixth Amendment: the state and multiple amici had explicitly framed the case as being about whether Swain should be reaffirmed, so the issue was fairly before the Court without needing special reargument.
Concurrence — Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor joined the Court's opinion and judgment but added that she agreed with the Chief Justice and Justice White that the new rule should not be applied retroactively to convictions that were already final.
Dissent — Justice Burger
Chief Justice Burger objected that the Court reached an equal protection question the defendant had expressly disclaimed at every stage, calling this a serious departure from normal practice that should at least have prompted reargument. On the merits, he argued the majority ignored the peremptory challenge's centuries-old history and function, and that the new fact-specific rule would create confusion for thousands of trial judges without actually improving fairness. He also agreed the ruling should not apply retroactively.
Dissent — Justice Rehnquist
“there is simply nothing "unequal" about the State's using its peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the jury in cases involving black defendants, so long as such challenges are also used to exclude whites in cases involving white defendants”Rehnquist's argument that evenly applied race-conscious strikes don't violate equal protection.
Justice Rehnquist argued the majority, with little analysis, overruled a distinct and important part of Swain holding that case-specific strikes based on a belief that jurors might favor a defendant of their own race do not violate equal protection. He reasoned that using race as one imperfect proxy for potential bias is not unconstitutional so long as it is applied evenhandedly across all racial groups, and would have affirmed the conviction.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court reaffirmed the century-old principle that a state violates equal protection when it purposefully excludes people of a defendant's race from jury service, tracing this back to an 1880 decision striking down a law barring Black jurors outright.
- The Court explained that this equal protection guarantee applies not just to how the initial jury pool is assembled but also to how individual jurors are struck during jury selection, including through peremptory strikes -- challenges that normally can be used for any reason without explanation.
- Applying general equal protection principles developed in other contexts, the Court held that a defendant can establish an initial ('prima facie') case of discrimination using only the facts from his own trial, rather than having to show a repeated pattern across many other, unrelated cases as lower courts had required after Swain v. Alabama.
- To make this showing, the defendant must show he belongs to a group that can be identified by race, that the prosecutor struck members of that group, and that the circumstances raise an inference the strikes were race-based.
- Once a defendant makes that initial showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to offer a race-neutral explanation for the strikes -- one connected to the case but not required to meet the higher standard needed to remove a juror 'for cause.'
- The trial court must then decide, weighing the prosecutor's explanation and all the circumstances, whether the defendant has proven the strikes were actually motivated by race.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Overrules Swain v. Alabama (380 U. S. 202)
Overrules the part of Swain requiring proof of a repeated pattern across many cases to challenge racially motivated jury strikes.
Reaffirms Strauder v. West Virginia (100 U. S. 303)
Reaffirms the century-old principle that purposeful racial exclusion from juries violates equal protection.