Reed v. Ross

Background

Daniel Ross was convicted of first-degree murder in North Carolina in 1969 and sentenced to life. At trial the jury was told Ross had to prove defenses like lack of malice and self-defense, following a century of state law. Years later, this Court’s 1975 decision (Mullaney) and a 1977 decision (Hankerson) said such burden-shifting violated due process and applied retroactively. Ross had not raised that issue on his original appeal and later sought relief in state and federal postconviction proceedings.

Reasoning

The Court considered whether Ross’ lawyer forfeited Ross’ right to relief by failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. The central question was whether counsel had “cause” to miss the objection. The Court held that novelty can qualify as cause when the legal basis for a constitutional claim was not reasonably available to counsel at the time. Looking at the law as it stood in 1969 (including Leland and a few isolated decisions), the Court found the claim was sufficiently novel and entrenched state practice made it unrealistic for counsel to press the argument then. Therefore Ross showed cause and his federal habeas claim could be heard.

Real world impact

The decision lets federal judges consider constitutional claims that state defendants failed to raise on direct appeal when those claims were genuinely novel and not reasonably discoverable by counsel at trial. That can reopen some older convictions and reduces the harshness of state procedural bars where the legal basis was unavailable. The opinion also warns states about administrative costs from renewed federal review.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice Powell concurred but noted limits on retroactivity; Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing novelty should not excuse counsel and warning the ruling undermines finality and strains court resources.