Strickland v. Washington
The Court set a new two-part test for claims that a criminal defense lawyer was so bad the Constitution was violated: the defendant must show the lawyer's work fell below reasonable professional standards, and that this made a real difference to the outcome.
Applying that test to a man sentenced to death in Florida whose lawyer skipped gathering character witnesses and psychiatric evidence, the Court found no constitutional violation, because the lawyer's choices were reasonable strategy and the missing evidence would not have changed the overwhelming case for aggravating circumstances.
“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”
The core standard the Court set for evaluating claims that a lawyer's performance was constitutionally inadequate.
How it got here: A federal trial court denied habeas relief after a hearing; a full appeals court reversed and set new legal standards; Florida officials asked the Supreme Court to review that decision.
The Case in Depth
What happened
During a crime spree in 1976, a man committed three murders along with kidnapping, assault, and other crimes, then confessed and pleaded guilty against his lawyer's advice. At his death-penalty sentencing, his lawyer chose not to seek out character witnesses or a psychiatric evaluation, relying instead on the defendant's own statements. The trial judge sentenced him to death, finding overwhelming aggravating factors and essentially no mitigating ones.
The question before the Court
If a defendant's lawyer makes mistakes at trial or sentencing, what must the defendant show to get the conviction or death sentence thrown out?
The Court's answer
The Court answered with a two-part test. First, the defendant must show the lawyer's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, judged with heavy deference and without hindsight. Second, the defendant must show a reasonable probability — enough to undermine confidence in the outcome — that the result would have been different without the lawyer's errors. Courts can reject a claim on either ground alone, without needing to address both.
Applying this test to the case, the Court found no violation. The lawyer's decision to rely on the plea colloquy rather than digging up character and psychiatric evidence was reasonable strategy, since it kept out the defendant's criminal history and blocked psychiatric rebuttal. And given the overwhelming aggravating evidence, there was no reasonable probability the missing evidence would have changed the death sentence.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
This decision created the standard nearly every ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in the country is now measured against, in both ordinary criminal cases and death penalty cases. Because the test requires proof that a lawyer's errors actually changed the outcome, many defendants whose lawyers made mistakes still cannot get new trials or new sentencing hearings unless they can show real harm.
What changes now
This is a final merits decision reversing the lower appeals court, which had ordered new factfinding under a different, more defendant-friendly standard. Because the Supreme Court found no constitutional violation under its newly announced test, the death sentence stands and no further proceedings on the ineffectiveness claim are required. The decision now governs how courts nationwide evaluate claims that a lawyer's poor performance requires a new trial or sentence.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide what standard applies to ordinary (non-capital) sentencing, and it did not resolve whether the same standards should be modified for the special context of capital sentencing, an adjustment Justice Brennan's concurrence and Justice Marshall's dissent both raised. The Court also did not address cases involving outright denial of counsel or government interference, which are governed by different, more defendant-favorable rules.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Brennan
Justice Brennan joined the majority's two-part test but dissented from the judgment because he believes the death penalty is always unconstitutional and would have vacated the sentence on that basis. He also urged that the standards be applied with special vigilance in capital sentencing given the unique finality and stakes of a death sentence.
Dissent — Justice Marshall
“To tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a criminal defendant must behave "reasonably" and must act like "a reasonably competent attorney," ante, at 687, is to tell them almost nothing.”Marshall's central objection that the majority's reasonableness standard offers little real guidance to courts.
Justice Marshall argued the majority's 'reasonableness' performance standard is too vague to guide courts and abandons the Court's duty to develop clearer rules. He also objected to requiring defendants to prove prejudice at all, arguing effective counsel is about fair process, not just guilt-innocence accuracy, and argued capital sentencing deserves a stricter standard. He would have found the lawyer's total failure to investigate mitigating evidence unreasonable and prejudicial, entitling the defendant to a new sentencing hearing.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court held that a defendant claiming his lawyer was constitutionally ineffective must prove two things: that the lawyer's performance was deficient, and that the deficient performance actually prejudiced the outcome.
- For the performance part, the Court adopted an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and said courts must be highly deferential, presuming a lawyer's choices were sound strategy unless proven otherwise, to avoid punishing lawyers through hindsight.
- For the prejudice part, the Court rejected a stricter rule requiring proof the outcome would probably have been different, and instead required only a 'reasonable probability' — enough to undermine confidence in the outcome — that the result would have differed without the errors.
- The Court explained that courts deciding these claims need not examine both parts in order and may reject a claim solely for lack of prejudice, without ever ruling on whether the lawyer's performance was actually deficient.
- Applying this framework, the Court found the lawyer's strategic decision to rely on the plea colloquy rather than presenting new character or psychiatric evidence was a reasonable professional judgment, since it avoided opening the door to damaging cross-examination and rebuttal evidence.
- The Court further concluded that even if the lawyer's choices had been unreasonable, the aggravating circumstances were so overwhelming that there was no reasonable probability the missing evidence would have changed the death sentence.