Martinez Ex Rel. Morales v. Bynum
The Court upheld a Texas law that denies tuition-free public schooling to children living apart from a parent or legal guardian if their main reason for being in the district is to attend its schools, ruling the law is simply a bona fide residence requirement.
Because the requirement applies the same basic residence test states may already use, and only affects families choosing a nontraditional living arrangement for school access, the Court found no violation of equal protection or the right to travel.
“A bona fide residence requirement simply requires that the person does establish residence before demanding the services that are restricted to residents.”
The Court's core rule that residence requirements for schooling don't burden the right to travel.
How it got here: A federal trial court ruled for the school district after a merits hearing; the Fifth Circuit affirmed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari given the issue's importance.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Roberto Morales, a U.S. citizen born in Texas to Mexican parents, moved from Mexico to live with his sister in McAllen, Texas, mainly so he could attend local public schools. Because his sister was his custodian but not his legal guardian, and his presence was found to be primarily for school attendance, the McAllen school district denied him free admission under a Texas statute governing residency for tuition-free schooling.
The question before the Court
Could Texas deny free public schooling to a child who moved in with a sibling, rather than a parent or guardian, mainly to attend that school district?
Why it matters
Families who send a child to live with relatives or other adult caretakers specifically to access a particular school district's free education may still be turned away unless the child genuinely intends to make that district home. School districts nationwide retain a legal basis for screening out students whose only tie to the district is school attendance itself.
What changes now
The ruling is final on the facial challenge, so the Texas statute remains in effect and school districts can continue applying it to deny tuition-free admission to children whose presence is primarily for schooling. The Court left open how the statute might apply to particular children in different factual situations, including Morales's own case, since only a facial challenge was before it.
What this does not decide
The Court expressly limited its ruling to a facial challenge and did not decide whether the statute is constitutional as applied to Morales or to other specific children, including those with noncitizen parents living abroad. It also did not address any due-process claim beyond the facial equal-protection question.
Concurrences and dissents
How the Justices voted
Majority (1). Justice Powell (author).
Separate writings (1). Justice Brennan (author of a concurrence).
Dissent (1). Justice Marshall (author).
Concurrence — Justice Brennan
Justice Brennan joined the majority in full but wrote separately to emphasize that the Court decided only a facial challenge. He stressed that the Court did not resolve whether the statute could be validly applied to Morales specifically, a U.S. citizen whose parents are noncitizens living abroad, and suggested that scenario might raise different considerations. Read the full concurrence →
Dissent — Justice Marshall
“the statute, as reinterpreted by the Court, imposes a standard even more difficult to meet than a domicile requirement for access to public education”Marshall's central objection that the majority misread the statute as more generous than it actually is.
Justice Marshall argued the majority misread the statute and misunderstood the difference between residence and domicile, contending the law actually imposes a domicile-like standard tougher than ordinary residence rules and applies it only to children living with custodians rather than parents or guardians. He would have applied heightened scrutiny given education's fundamental importance, found the state's justifications unsubstantiated and non-uniform, and struck the law down as an equal protection violation. Read the full dissent →
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court distinguished durational residence requirements, which impose a waiting period before an already-qualified resident can get a benefit and which the Court has often struck down, from bona fide residence requirements, which simply require someone to actually live somewhere with intent to stay, and which the Court has consistently upheld.
- Applying that framework, the Court explained that a bona fide residence requirement for free public schooling does not burden the constitutional right to interstate travel, because anyone remains free to move to a district and establish residence there before seeking its services.
- The Court also pointed to local control of schools as an independent justification, reasoning that letting only genuine residents attend safeguards school districts' ability to plan enrollment, staffing, and budgets.
- Turning to the Texas statute, the Court read it to require only that a child have a bona fide intention to remain in the district indefinitely, and found the law more generous than a traditional residence test because it also lets children stay tuition-free even without that intent, so long as school attendance isn't their sole reason for being there.
- Because the statute tracked or exceeded the traditional definition of residence and had no apparent discriminatory purpose, the Court concluded it satisfied the rational-basis standard applicable to bona fide residence requirements.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Shapiro v. Thompson (394 U. S. 618)
Struck down a waiting-period rule for benefits but is distinguished from bona fide residence rules like this one.
Reaffirms Vlandis v. Kline (412 U. S. 441)
Reaffirmed that states may use bona fide residence or domicile tests for tuition purposes.
Reaffirms Plyler v. Doe (457 U. S. 202)
Reaffirmed that school districts may apply established residence criteria even while barring alienage-based exclusions.