Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.
Headline: Massachusetts law letting churches and schools veto liquor-licensing within 500 feet is struck down for breaching church‑state separation, preventing religious bodies from controlling nearby liquor licenses.
Holding:
- Prevents churches and schools from vetoing nearby liquor licenses in Massachusetts.
- State governments must avoid delegating licensing power to religious bodies.
- Legislatures can instead use distance bans or public licensing hearings.
Summary
Background
A restaurant in Harvard Square applied for an alcoholic beverages license next to Holy Cross Armenian Catholic Parish, whose building was about 10 feet away. Massachusetts law (Section 16C) said any premises within 500 feet of a church or school could be denied a liquor license if the institution’s governing body filed a written objection. The local license agency denied the restaurant’s application based solely on the church’s objection. The restaurant sued, and a federal district court held the statute unconstitutional. The full federal appeals court affirmed the district court on Establishment Clause grounds, and the Supreme Court granted review and affirmed.
Reasoning
The key question was whether the State may give churches and schools effective veto power over liquor licenses without violating the Constitution’s ban on government establishment of religion. The Court said Section 16C delegates a core governmental licensing function to private religious bodies, effectively advancing religion and entangling church and state. The Court applied the familiar three-part test for establishment claims and concluded the statute’s delegation and lack of neutral standards produced impermissible religious involvement in government decisionmaking. The Court noted the State could achieve the same secular goals by other means, such as an outright distance ban or by ensuring institutions have a chance to be heard at licensing hearings.
Real world impact
The decision invalidates Massachusetts’s 500-foot veto scheme and prevents churches and schools there from unilaterally blocking liquor licenses. The Court did not rule on the constitutionality of other States’ distance rules and explicitly declined to decide other claims in the case, such as due process or antitrust. The opinion warns states not to delegate discretionary licensing power to religious institutions without neutral standards.
Dissents or concurrances
Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing the statute was a sensible, less restrictive way to protect worship and educational activities and criticizing the majority’s reliance on labeling the statute a “veto.”
Opinions in this case:
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