Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper
Headline: Court limits when lawyers can be forced to pay opposing counsel’s fees, rejects reading civil-rights fee laws into the sanction statute, and leaves discovery and inherent-power fee questions to lower courts.
Holding:
- Limits use of civil-rights fee laws to punish opposing lawyers directly.
- Allows courts to award fees for discovery abuse under Rule 37.
- Permits narrow inherent-power fee sanctions when counsel acted in bad faith.
Summary
Background
In 1975 three individuals filed a racial discrimination class action against a national trucking company. Their three lawyers repeatedly ignored discovery orders, missed deadlines, and failed to prosecute. The district court dismissed the case and ordered the lawyers to pay the company’s costs and attorney’s fees; the court of appeals narrowed that award to costs under a statute about lawyer liability.
Reasoning
The Supreme Court examined whether 28 U.S.C. § 1927 — the statute that permits courts to require lawyers to pay excess "costs" for multiplying proceedings — includes attorney’s fees awarded under civil-rights statutes, and whether courts have inherent power to make counsel pay fees. The Court concluded § 1927 should be read in light of the 19th-century statutory scheme limiting taxable costs to the items listed in § 1920, and thus does not authorize general civil-rights attorney’s fees against opposing counsel. The Court also explained that Rule 37 can authorize fee awards for discovery abuse and that courts, in narrow circumstances, retain inherent power to sanction counsel for bad faith, but such sanctions require specific findings.
Real world impact
On remand lower courts may recalculate recoverable costs under § 1927 and may consider fee claims under Rule 37 or the court’s inherent authority, but they must make the necessary findings about discovery violations or bad faith. The decision clarifies that civil-rights fee statutes do not automatically create personal liability for opposing lawyers while preserving other sanctioning routes.
Dissents or concurrances
Several Justices disagreed about § 1927. Some urged that § 1927 should permit shifting attorney’s fees in civil-rights cases so innocent clients are not penalized; others would leave the inherent-power issue to the district court to decide first.
Opinions in this case:
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