Diamond v. Chakrabarty
The Court ruled that a live, human-made bacterium engineered to break down crude oil can be patented, because it is a human invention rather than something found in nature.
The decision opened the door to patents on genetically engineered organisms more broadly, shaping how the growing biotechnology industry could protect its inventions for decades to come.
“His discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101.”
The Court's core reasoning for why the engineered bacterium qualifies as a patentable invention.
How it got here: The Patent Office Board of Appeals rejected the bacterium claim; the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed twice; the Commissioner sought Supreme Court review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
A microbiologist named Chakrabarty, working for General Electric, genetically engineered a bacterium capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil, something no naturally occurring bacterium could do. He hoped it could help clean up oil spills. He sought a patent on the bacterium itself, but a patent examiner rejected that claim, reasoning that living things and products of nature cannot be patented.
The question before the Court
Can a scientist patent a living bacterium that he genetically engineered to break down crude oil?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court ruled that Chakrabarty's genetically engineered bacterium is patentable, because the patent statute's terms "manufacture" and "composition of matter" were written in broad language meant to cover any human-made invention. The key distinction is not between living and non-living things, but between products of nature and things people actually create.
Since no bacterium in nature had the oil-degrading plasmid combination Chakrabarty engineered, his bacterium was his own handiwork rather than nature's, placing it squarely within the statute's broad reach. The Court rejected arguments that earlier plant-patent laws or the novelty of genetic engineering meant Congress had to act first before such inventions could be patented.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies gained clear legal grounds to patent engineered microorganisms, encouraging investment in genetic research. The ruling meant inventors of living organisms — not just chemicals or machines — could claim exclusive rights, shaping the modern biotech industry's reliance on patents to fund research.
What changes now
The ruling is a final merits decision affirming that Chakrabarty's bacterium is patentable subject matter, so the patent process could proceed on that claim (subject to other requirements like novelty, not addressed here). The decision became a foundational precedent for patenting living organisms, including later inventions in biotechnology and genetic engineering, unless Congress chose to legislate limits, which it left open to do.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether Chakrabarty's bacterium met other patent requirements like novelty and nonobviousness, and it did not resolve broader ethical or safety debates about genetic engineering, which it said belong to Congress and the political branches, not the courts.
Concurrences and dissents
Dissent — Justice Brennan
“It is the role of Congress, not this Court, to broaden or narrow the reach of the patent laws.”The dissent's central objection that only Congress should decide whether living organisms can be patented.
Justice Brennan argued that the 1930 Plant Patent Act and 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act showed Congress believed living organisms were not patentable under the general patent statute, since Congress felt it needed separate legislation to protect plants. He stressed that the 1970 Act explicitly excluded bacteria from protection, which he read as evidence Congress did not intend bacteria to be patentable at all, and would leave the question of extending patents to living organisms to Congress rather than the courts.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court read the patent statute's terms 'manufacture' and 'composition of matter' according to their broad, ordinary dictionary meanings, noting Congress used expansive language and the comprehensive word 'any' to describe what could be patented.
- The Court traced the statute's history back to Thomas Jefferson's Patent Act of 1793 and legislative reports stating patentable subject matter was meant to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man,' supporting a wide reading of the law.
- The Court distinguished between products of nature — laws of nature, minerals, wild plants — which cannot be patented, and human-made inventions, which can, regardless of whether the invention is living or not.
- Applying that line to the facts, the Court found the bacterium was not a product of nature because no naturally occurring bacterium had the plasmid combination or oil-degrading properties Chakrabarty engineered; the bacterium was therefore his own handiwork, not nature's.
- The Court rejected the argument that two prior plant-patent statutes showed Congress believed living things generally fell outside the patent law, concluding those statutes addressed specific problems with plants rather than establishing a living/nonliving divide.
- The Court concluded that because Congress had not carved bacteria or genetically engineered organisms out of the broad statutory language, the bacterium qualified as patentable subject matter under the statute as written.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. (333 U. S. 127)
The Court distinguished this case, noting that unlike the natural bacteria mixture there, Chakrabarty created something genuinely new.
Distinguishes Parker v. Flook (437 U. S. 584)
The Court said Flook's caution about unforeseen inventions does not make new types of inventions automatically unpatentable.