Fare v. Michael C.

Background

A 16½-year-old on probation was taken into custody and given Miranda warnings (the right to remain silent and to have a lawyer). When asked if he wanted an attorney, he asked instead to have his probation officer present. The officers would not call the probation officer; the juvenile said he would talk, then made incriminating statements and sketches. A Juvenile Court found he waived his rights, but the California Supreme Court reversed, holding that a juvenile’s request for a probation officer automatically invoked the right to remain silent.

Reasoning

The Supreme Court majority rejected that automatic rule. It explained that Miranda’s per se protection rests on the lawyer’s special role in protecting legal rights. A probation officer is not the same: often not a lawyer, employed by the State, and in some cases required to report wrongdoing. Therefore a request for a probation officer is not automatically the same as asking for an attorney. Instead, courts must decide admissibility by looking at the totality of the circumstances — including the juvenile’s age, experience, and whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. Applying that test, the Court found the juvenile here knowingly waived and that the statements were admissible.

Real world impact

The decision removes a blanket rule that would have blocked questioning whenever a juvenile asked for a probation officer. Police and juvenile courts must evaluate each case’s facts to determine whether a juvenile truly invoked his rights or knowingly waived them. The California Supreme Court’s judgment was reversed and the case remanded.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice Marshall (joined by Brennan and Stevens) dissented, urging that juveniles often turn to adults obligated to protect them and that such requests should be treated as per se invocations; Justice Powell also dissented, arguing the particular interrogation here was overly coercive and should have been upheld.