Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney
Headline: Ruling upholds Massachusetts's lifetime veterans hiring preference, rejecting an equal-protection challenge and allowing the policy to continue despite its disproportionate impact on women.
Holding: The Court held that Massachusetts' absolute lifetime veterans hiring preference does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it is facially neutral, serves legitimate veteran-related goals, and lacked proof of gender-based discriminatory purpose.
- Allows Massachusetts to continue its absolute veterans hiring preference.
- Many women remain displaced from higher civil service jobs by lower-scoring veterans.
- Courts require proof of intentional gender-based purpose, not just harmful outcomes.
Summary
Background
A non-veteran woman, Helen B. Feeney, sued Massachusetts after repeatedly scoring high on civil service exams but being passed over because veterans are always ranked ahead of nonveterans. The State law gives an absolute, lifetime hiring advantage to veterans for most classified public jobs. A three-judge federal court found the law devastated women's job opportunities and struck it down; the State appealed, and the Supreme Court took the case.
Reasoning
The central question was whether the veterans' preference law violates the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against women. The Court said the law is neutral on its face and serves legitimate veteran-related goals — like rewarding service and easing readjustment — and that unequal effects alone do not prove illegal sex-based discrimination. To win, petitioners had to show the legislature adopted the law at least partly because of a gender-based purpose. The Court found no such proof and reversed the lower court.
Real world impact
Because the Court required evidence of intentional sex-based purpose rather than showing only a disproportionate effect, Massachusetts' absolute veterans preference survives. As a result, veterans continue to enjoy a strong hiring edge, and many women who scored well on exams remain displaced by lower-scoring veterans. The decision was sent back for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s reasoning.
Dissents or concurrances
One Justice concurred, noting many men are also disadvantaged and so disputing intent inferences. A dissent argued the preference was foreseeable in its gendered effect, could reflect purposeful discrimination, and that less-discriminatory alternatives existed.
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