County of Los Angeles v. Davis

Background

In 1973 a group representing present and future Black and Mexican‑American applicants sued Los Angeles County about firefighter hiring practices. The District Court found the county’s use of unvalidated written exams violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, enjoined discriminatory practices, and ordered affirmative hiring steps including at least 20% of new recruits be Black and 20% Mexican‑American. The Court of Appeals reversed the 1969‑test ruling for lack of standing but affirmed the judgment as to the county’s threatened 1972 plan. The 1972 proposal would have interviewed the top 544 scorers (492 white, 10 Black, 33 Mexican‑American) but was abandoned before it took effect.

Reasoning

The Supreme Court did not reach the broader question of whether racially exclusionary effects alone violate § 1981 or whether quotas are appropriate. Instead it held the remaining controversy about the 1972 plan had become moot. The Court relied on two factual findings in the record: the county had not used unvalidated written scores to rank applicants since 1969 and had, during the litigation, adopted a new, nonrandom screening system that interviews large groups (500 applicants including specified race‑based interview pools), rates candidates without race‑based points, and hires from those interview scores. The county’s new procedures produced minority hiring above 50% each year. Because there was no reasonable expectation the old practice would recur and the effects were eradicated, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment and directed that the district court dismiss the action.

Real world impact

The decision ends this round of litigation without a Supreme Court ruling on whether § 1981 requires proof of intentional discrimination or on the validity of quota remedies. The appellate opinion is vacated and loses precedential effect. The district court’s remedial order will not be sustained by this Court now, and the dispute could be relitigated in a new case.

Dissents or concurrances

Three Justices dissented, arguing the case was not moot and urging the Court to resolve whether § 1981 requires discriminatory intent; one dissent would have narrowed the remedy rather than dismissed the suit.