Crist, Warden, Et Al. v. Cline Et Al.

1977-12-12

Headline: Restored case asks whether double‑jeopardy protection attaches when a jury is sworn or only when the first witness is sworn, potentially changing when defendants are protected in state and federal trials.

Holding: The Court restored the case for reargument and asked whether the Constitution requires jeopardy to attach when the jury is sworn or only after the first witness is sworn.

Real World Impact:

Could change when defendants gain double‑jeopardy protection in criminal trials.
May affect both state and federal jury and nonjury trials.
Solicitor General invited to present the federal Government’s view in the case.

Topics: double jeopardy, criminal trials, jury procedures, state and federal trials

Summary

Background

This dispute involves Montana prison officials and two men who were state-court defendants. The Court restored the case to its calendar for reargument and asked counsel to brief and discuss two specific timing questions about when double‑jeopardy protection begins during a criminal trial.

Reasoning

The Court asked whether the long‑standing federal rule that jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn is constitutionally required, or whether the Constitution might instead require that jeopardy wait until the first witness is sworn in any trial, state or federal, jury or nonjury. The Solicitor General was invited to file a brief stating the federal Government’s view. The order does not resolve the issue on the merits; it seeks additional briefing and argument to consider possibly changing the rule.

Real world impact

If the Court rethinks the timing rule, the result could change when defendants gain permanent protection against retrial after a mistrial or abortive proceeding. The question reaches both state and federal criminal trials and could affect many cases where trials end before witness testimony begins. At this stage, the Court’s action only starts a process of reargument and is not a final change in the law.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice Marshall dissented from the order. He criticized the Court for anticipating a broad federal rule using state parties, objected to inviting only the Solicitor General for the federal perspective, and stressed the long history of the existing rule dating back to the 19th century.