Bordenkircher v. Hayes

1978-03-06

Headline: Decision allows prosecutors to threaten more serious reindictment during plea negotiations, upholding that leverage and making it easier for prosecutors to pressure defendants to accept plea deals.

Holding: The Court held that a prosecutor’s open threat to seek a more serious habitual‑offender indictment during plea bargaining did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause when the prosecutor had probable cause and the defendant was free to refuse.

Real World Impact:

Permits prosecutors to threaten harsher reindictment during plea negotiations.
Increases leverage for prosecutors to pressure defendants to plead guilty.
Limits courts’ ability to block such threats absent clear procedural violations.

Topics: plea bargaining, prosecutorial discretion, due process, criminal sentencing

Summary

Background

A man was charged in Kentucky with passing a forged $88.30 check. During plea talks the prosecutor offered to recommend five years if the man pleaded guilty but warned that, if he refused, the prosecutor would seek a habitual‑offender indictment that could bring a mandatory life sentence. The prosecutor later obtained that indictment, a jury convicted the man, and he was sentenced under the habitual offender law.

Reasoning

The Supreme Court majority focused on whether the prosecutor’s open threat during bargaining violated the Constitution’s guarantee of fair process. The Court said plea bargaining is a “give‑and‑take” where defendants and prosecutors accept mutual advantage. Because the prosecutor had evidence supporting the harsher charge and the defendant was free to accept or reject the offer, the Court held that the prosecutor’s conduct did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.

Real world impact

The ruling confirms that prosecutors may openly use the possibility of more serious charges as bargaining leverage when they have a basis to bring those charges. The decision reverses the Court of Appeals and leaves plea negotiations largely within prosecutorial discretion, while recognizing that constitutional limits still exist in other circumstances. The opinion also notes Kentucky later narrowed its habitual‑offender law, which would have reduced the maximum exposure in this case.

Dissents or concurrances

Three Justices dissented. Two dissents argued the prosecutor admitted his motive was to punish the defendant for insisting on trial and that prior cases protecting defendants from vindictive reprisals should control; they would have affirmed the appeals court.