United States v. Lovasco
Headline: Court allows prosecutors to delay indictments to continue investigations without automatic dismissal, reverses lower courts and makes it harder for defendants to get indictments tossed over preindictment delay.
Holding:
- Makes it harder for defendants to dismiss charges for preindictment delay alone.
- Permits prosecutors to delay indictments while investigating additional suspects.
- Courts still may dismiss prosecutions for deliberate tactical delay or reckless disregard.
Summary
Background
A man was indicted in March 1975 for possessing eight firearms stolen from the U.S. mails and for dealing in guns without a license. The crimes were alleged to have occurred in July–August 1973, more than 18 months before the indictment. At a hearing the defendant presented a Postal Inspector’s report made about a month after the crimes, a stipulation that little new information was found in the following 17 months, and claimed loss of two witness testimonies due to death. The District Court dismissed the indictment as unexplained and prejudicial; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Reasoning
The core question was when a long preindictment delay violates the Constitution. The Court relied on earlier law saying that prejudice alone does not automatically require dismissal and that courts must weigh both the reason for the delay and any harm to the defense. The majority explained that investigative delay—waiting to develop more evidence or identify other suspects—is often reasonable and does not itself violate due process unless it reflects bad faith or deliberate tactical delay. The Court accepted the Government’s representation that the delay was investigative and reversed the dismissal.
Real world impact
Lower courts must now balance the prosecutor’s reasons for waiting against any shown prejudice. Defendants will find it harder to get indictments dismissed for mere delay when the Government reasonably investigated further. The decision leaves open dismissal in cases of deliberate or reckless prosecutorial delay.
Dissents or concurrances
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing the record did not support the Government’s claimed investigative reason and that the trial courts’ factual findings of unexplained, prejudicial delay should stand.
Opinions in this case:
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