Stone v. Powell
The Supreme Court ruled that state prisoners generally cannot use federal habeas corpus to relitigate Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure claims if state courts already gave them a full and fair chance to raise those claims at trial and on appeal.
The decision sharply narrows the role of federal courts in policing state-court search-and-seizure rulings after a conviction becomes final, on the theory that the exclusionary rule's crime-fighting costs outweigh its limited extra deterrent value at that late stage.
How it got here: State courts rejected both prisoners' search-and-seizure claims and affirmed their convictions; federal district and appeals courts then granted habeas relief, and the state wardens asked the Supreme Court to review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder in California after a gun tied to the killing was found during his arrest under a vagrancy ordinance he claimed was unconstitutional. David Rice was convicted of murder in Nebraska after police searched his home and found explosives and evidence used to convict him, based on a warrant he claimed was invalid. Both men, after losing on direct appeal in state court, sought federal habeas corpus relief arguing the evidence used against them was illegally obtained.
The question before the Court
If a state prisoner already got a full and fair chance to argue that police searched him illegally, can he raise that same search-and-seizure claim again in federal court through habeas corpus?
Why it matters
Convicted defendants who believe evidence was illegally seized now have only one meaningful shot — in the state courts and, if they choose, a petition to the Supreme Court — rather than a second opportunity in federal district court years later. This significantly reduces the federal courts' caseload of search-and-seizure habeas claims and gives state criminal convictions more finality.
What changes now
The ruling is a final merits decision, so the judgments in favor of Powell and Rice were reversed and their earlier habeas relief undone; each remains subject to his original state conviction unless he can show he never got a full and fair state-court hearing on his Fourth Amendment claim. Going forward, similar search-and-seizure claims in federal habeas petitions from state prisoners will generally be barred unless that narrow exception applies, though claims about other constitutional violations, such as coerced confessions, remain unaffected by this decision.
What this does not decide
The Court said its ruling does not strip federal courts of jurisdiction to hear these claims, and does not disturb the rule that illegally seized evidence must still be excluded at trial and on direct appeal. It also left open whether the same limit applies to other kinds of constitutional claims raised in habeas petitions, addressing only Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure claims.
Concurrences and dissents
How the Justices voted
Majority (1). Justice Powell (author).
Separate writings (1). Justice Burger (author of a concurrence).
Dissent (2). Justice Brennan (author).
Concurrence — Justice Burger
Chief Justice Burger agreed with the Court's decision but argued it did not go far enough. He contended the exclusionary rule itself, even at trial, should be substantially cut back or limited to egregious, bad-faith police conduct, arguing it excludes highly reliable evidence and produces little proven deterrent benefit while imposing large social costs. Read the full concurrence →
Dissent — Justice Brennan
Justice Brennan argued the majority disguised a statutory rewrite of the habeas corpus statutes as a constitutional ruling, without acknowledging it was overruling a long line of precedent allowing habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims. He contended that once evidence is unconstitutionally admitted under Mapp v. Ohio, a prisoner is by definition held in violation of the Constitution, so there is no logical basis for later denying habeas relief, and warned the decision threatens to erode habeas review of other constitutional rights too. Read the full dissent →
Dissent — Justice White
Justice White argued there was no principled way to treat Fourth Amendment claims differently from other constitutional claims on habeas, illustrating with a hypothetical of two co-defendants convicted on identical evidence where one wins on direct review and the other is denied habeas relief for the same violation. He would have kept habeas available for Fourth Amendment claims, though he also separately argued the exclusionary rule itself should be narrowed to exclude a good-faith exception for officers acting reasonably. Read the full dissent →
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court framed the question as one of weighing the ongoing usefulness of the exclusionary rule (the rule that illegally seized evidence cannot be used at trial) against the costs of applying it again years later on federal habeas review, rather than treating the issue as a fixed constitutional entitlement.
- The Court explained that the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right belonging to the defendant, but a court-made remedy whose main purpose is to deter police misconduct, and it has never been applied in every setting regardless of context — for example, it does not apply in grand jury proceedings or to bar evidence used to impeach a testifying defendant.
- Applying that cost-benefit view, the Court reasoned that once a defendant has already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim in state trial and appellate courts, letting a federal habeas court redo that inquiry adds little additional deterrence of police misconduct, since officers are unlikely to alter their conduct based on the remote possibility of a second, later review.
- The Court weighed this minimal added deterrent value against the substantial costs of relitigating search-and-seizure claims on habeas: excluding often highly reliable evidence, diverting the criminal process from the question of guilt or innocence, and undermining the finality of state convictions long after trial.
- Concluding that the costs outweighed the benefits in this specific context, the Court held that a full and fair opportunity to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim in state court forecloses relief on that same ground in a later federal habeas corpus proceeding.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Overrules Kaufman v. United States (394 U. S. 217)
Rejects Kaufman's view that federal habeas review of state convictions must include Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure claims.
Limits Mapp v. Ohio (367 U. S. 643)
Its exclusionary rule still applies at trial and on direct appeal but no longer extends to federal habeas review.