Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth
The Court struck down Missouri's requirements that a married woman get her husband's written consent and that an unmarried minor get a parent's consent before an abortion in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, along with a ban on a common abortion method and a rule forcing doctors to protect a fetus at every stage.
At the same time, the Court upheld the law's definition of fetal viability, its requirement that a woman give written informed consent, and its recordkeeping rules, reinforcing that the choice to end an early pregnancy belongs to the woman and her doctor without a veto from a spouse, parent, or the state.
“since the State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage, when the physician and his patient make that decision, the State cannot delegate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion during that same period.”
The Court's core reasoning for striking down the requirement that a husband consent to his wife's abortion.
How it got here: A three-judge federal district court upheld most of the law but struck part of the fetal-care provision; both sides appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Missouri passed a new abortion law shortly after Roe v. Wade, regulating abortions at every stage of pregnancy. A Missouri abortion clinic and two doctors who performed abortions sued the state's attorney general and a local prosecutor, challenging provisions requiring spousal and parental consent, a written consent from the patient, a ban on a common abortion technique, recordkeeping rules, and a duty to protect the fetus during the procedure.
The question before the Court
Could Missouri require a wife to get her husband's written consent, or require an unmarried minor to get a parent's consent, before having an early abortion?
Why it matters
Married women and unmarried minors in Missouri no longer needed a spouse's or parent's sign-off to get an early abortion, a rule other states with similar consent laws would also have to abandon. Doctors also gained clarity that they would not face manslaughter charges for using accepted abortion techniques or for treating a nonviable fetus differently than one that could survive outside the womb.
What changes now
The case was sent back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the ruling, including reconsidering the abortion clinic's standing to challenge a provision about infants born alive after failed abortions. The decision itself is a final merits ruling on the constitutionality of the challenged provisions, though it left open how far states could go with less absolute consultation requirements, an issue the Court addressed further the same day in a companion case.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may consent to an abortion without any parental involvement, nor did it resolve whether a law requiring parental consultation with a judicial alternative -- rather than an absolute veto -- would be constitutional. It also left the clinic's standing to challenge the newborn-custody provision for the lower court to decide.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Stewart
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Powell, agreed with the Court but stressed that the written-consent requirement was about ensuring an informed decision, not restricting it. He viewed the husband-consent question as a genuinely close clash of competing constitutional interests, ultimately resolved in the woman's favor because she bears the physical burden of pregnancy. He suggested a law requiring parental consultation with a judicial bypass option would raise a different, more defensible question than the flat parental veto struck down here.
Concurrence in part — Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens joined the Court's opinion except for the parts striking down the parental-consent and saline-amniocentesis provisions. He agreed the saline ban was unconstitutional because the safer alternative was not actually available, making the ban a near-total abortion prohibition. But he argued the parental-consent requirement was a reasonable protective measure for minors, comparable to other age-based restrictions the law imposes, and did not conflict with Roe.
Dissent in part — Justice White
Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, argued the Court was wrong to strike down the spousal-consent, parental-consent, and saline-amniocentesis provisions, and to invalidate the fetal-care standard as unseverable. He contended a husband has his own constitutionally significant interest in a child he helped conceive, that parental consent protects minors from immature decisions, and that the record did not actually show the safer abortion method was unavailable in Missouri.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court applied the framework from Roe v. Wade, under which the state cannot interfere with a woman's and her doctor's decision to end a pregnancy during the first trimester, but may reasonably regulate for maternal health afterward and may protect fetal life after viability.
- Because the state itself could not ban abortions during the first trimester, the Court reasoned it likewise could not hand that same blocking power to a third party -- a husband or a parent -- since a state cannot delegate authority it does not itself possess.
- Applying that principle, the Court found the spousal-consent and parental-consent requirements gave a third party an unreviewable veto over the woman's and physician's decision, without a strong enough justification tied to protecting maternal health.
- On the ban on the saline amniocentesis method, the Court asked whether the restriction reasonably related to protecting maternal health, and found that because a safer alternative (prostaglandin) was not actually available in Missouri at the relevant time, the ban functioned as a near-total block on abortions after the first trimester rather than a health measure.
- On the fetal-care standard, the Court read the statute's plain text as requiring doctors to protect the fetus at every stage of pregnancy, not just after viability, making it impermissibly broad under Roe's trimester framework, and it held the section could not be salvaged in part because its provisions were too intertwined.
- By contrast, the Court found the law's definition of viability, the requirement of the woman's own written informed consent, and the recordkeeping rules did not conflict with Roe because they left medical judgment with the physician and did not obstruct the abortion decision itself.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 113)
The Court applied and reinforced Roe's trimester framework to strike down and uphold different parts of Missouri's abortion law.
Reaffirms Doe v. Bolton (410 U.S. 179)
The Court relied on Doe's reasoning to confirm that physicians facing prosecution risk have standing to challenge abortion restrictions.