Elrod v. Burns
The Supreme Court ruled that firing government employees simply because they belong to the wrong political party violates the First Amendment's protections for political belief and association.
The decision limits patronage dismissals to policymaking positions, meaning most rank-and-file public employees can no longer be fired just for their party affiliation when a new administration takes power.
How it got here: A federal trial court dismissed the employees' complaint; the Seventh Circuit reversed and ordered injunctive relief; the Sheriff and other officials sought Supreme Court review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
When Republican Sheriff of Cook County was replaced by Democrat Richard Elrod in 1970, several Republican non-civil-service employees of the Sheriff's Office—including a chief deputy, a bailiff, and a process server—were fired or threatened with firing solely because they lacked Democratic Party affiliation or sponsorship, a longstanding local patronage practice.
The question before the Court
Can a county sheriff fire non-civil-service employees just because they weren't members of or sponsored by the political party now in power?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that firing nonpolicymaking public employees solely because they belong to a different political party than the newly elected officeholder violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Because patronage dismissals significantly burden employees' freedom of belief and association, the government had to show a compelling interest served by the least restrictive means, and it failed to do so for ordinary employees.
The Court did recognize a narrower interest in making sure elected officials can carry out policies the voters approved, but found that interest fully satisfied by allowing patronage dismissals for policymaking or confidential positions only. For everyone else — like the process servers and bailiffs in this case — losing a job over party affiliation is unconstitutional, though which specific jobs count as "policymaking" will be sorted out on remand.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Millions of state and local government workers in non-civil-service jobs gain protection from being fired every time control of an office changes party hands. Local governments and elected officials must now show a policymaking justification before replacing employees for political reasons, reshaping how patronage-heavy offices like sheriffs' departments operate.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower courts, where the burden falls on the Sheriff's office to prove which specific positions qualify as policymaking or confidential and thus remain subject to patronage dismissal, with doubts resolved in favor of the employees. The ruling establishes a nationwide constitutional limit on patronage firings for nonpolicymaking government jobs, though the exact policymaking/nonpolicymaking line will be worked out case by case in future litigation.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether patronage hiring (as opposed to firing) is unconstitutional, nor did it address patronage practices involving policymaking or confidential positions, contracts, or other forms of political patronage beyond dismissals of ordinary employees.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Stewart
Justice Stewart concurred only in the judgment, on a much narrower ground: a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential employee who is doing his job well cannot be fired solely for his political beliefs. He declined to join the plurality's broad discussion of patronage generally and explicitly reserved judgment on whether hiring decisions based on party membership would be constitutional.
Dissent — Justice Burger
“The Court strains the rational bounds of First Amendment doctrine and runs counter to longstanding practices that are part of the fabric of our democratic system to hold that the Constitution commands something it has not been thought to require for 185 years.”Chief Justice Burger's core objection that the majority is inventing a constitutional rule out of thin air.
Chief Justice Burger argued the Court was improperly intruding on matters the Constitution leaves to the states and Congress, comparing the ruling to federal overreach into state governance. He emphasized that the Illinois Legislature had deliberately structured the Sheriff's office to allow patronage for half its staff, and that this policy choice deserved deference rather than constitutional override.
Dissent — Justice Powell
Justice Powell argued patronage has deep historical roots and actually promotes democracy by stimulating political participation and strengthening parties, especially in low-profile local offices like the sheriff's. He contended the plurality underestimated the government's interest in patronage and overstated the burden on employees, and would have upheld the practice as a permissible, modest intrusion on First Amendment interests best left to state and local judgment.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court held that patronage dismissals significantly burden First Amendment rights of belief and association because employees must pledge allegiance, campaign, or pay tribute to the incumbent party to keep their jobs, coercing belief through economic pressure.
- Because this is a significant impairment of First Amendment rights, the Court applied strict scrutiny — the demanding test requiring the government to show a compelling interest and that its means are the least restrictive way to achieve it.
- The Court considered and rejected the government-efficiency justification, finding that wholesale replacement of employees does not actually promote efficient government and that mere political difference does not predict poor job performance.
- The Court also rejected the broader democratic-process justification, reasoning that political parties survived and even thrived after merit systems reduced patronage, so patronage dismissals were not necessary to sustain party politics.
- The Court accepted a narrower interest in ensuring that elected officials' policies are carried out, but found this interest can be fully satisfied by limiting patronage dismissals to policymaking and confidential positions rather than applying it to all employees.
- Applying this framework, the Court concluded that patronage dismissals of nonpolicymaking employees are unconstitutional, while leaving open on remand which specific positions in the Sheriff's Office qualify as policymaking.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Keyishian v. Board of Regents (385 U.S. 589)
The Court relies on this case's rule that political association alone cannot justify denying public employment.
Reaffirms Perry v. Sindermann (408 U.S. 593)
The Court applies this case's rule that government benefits cannot be conditioned on giving up constitutional rights.
Distinguishes United Public Workers v. Mitchell (330 U.S. 75)
The Court distinguishes this case, saying its rationale for restricting political activity does not justify patronage dismissals.