Runyon v. McCrary
The Supreme Court ruled that a Reconstruction-era civil rights law bars private schools from refusing to admit children because of their race, even though the schools are not run by the government.
The decision confirmed that a 19th-century law guaranteeing everyone the same right to make contracts as white citizens reaches purely private discrimination, not just government action, and rejected the schools' claims that being forced to admit Black children violated their constitutional rights to free association, privacy, and parental control over education.
“the Constitution . . . places no value on discrimination”
Explaining why a school's freedom-of-association claim could not shield racial exclusion.
How it got here: A federal trial court and the full Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled for the children on the discrimination claim; the schools and the families each asked the Supreme Court to review different parts of the ruling.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Two Black children, Michael McCrary and Colin Gonzales, were turned away from two private schools in Virginia — Bobbe's School and the Fairfax-Brewster School — solely because they were Black. Both schools advertised broadly to the public through mailers and phone-book ads but had never admitted a Black child. Their parents sued, and a national association of Southern private schools that also excluded Black students intervened to defend the schools' practices.
The question before the Court
Could two private, nonreligious schools legally refuse to admit children just because they were Black?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that a federal civil rights law from 1866, which guarantees everyone the same right to make contracts as white citizens, bars private schools from refusing to admit children solely because they are Black. Because these schools openly advertised their services to the public and were paid for tuition like any other contract, denying Black children the chance to enroll violated that guarantee, regardless of the fact that no government agency was involved.
The Court also rejected the schools' constitutional defenses, holding that neither freedom of association, parental rights over education, nor any privacy right protects a private school's decision to exclude students by race once it has opened its doors to the general public. The schools remained free to teach whatever values they chose — they simply could not use race as a barrier to entry.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Private schools and other businesses that openly advertise their services to the general public cannot turn away Black customers or students because of their race, even without any government involvement. The ruling gave Black families a federal legal tool to challenge racial exclusion by private commercial schools, while leaving untouched more selective, personal arrangements like small membership clubs or private tutoring.
What changes now
The judgment of the Fourth Circuit was affirmed in full: the schools remained barred from denying admission based on race, the McCrary family's damages award stood, and the Gonzales family's separate damages claim remained barred by Virginia's two-year statute of limitations. Because this was a final merits decision, no further proceedings were needed on the core discrimination question, though the case has continued to define how far the same statute can reach into other private relationships.
What this does not decide
The Court expressly said it was not deciding whether the law applies to private social clubs, single-sex schools, religious schools that exclude on religious grounds, or truly personal and selective contractual relationships like hiring a babysitter or tutor. It also did not decide the statute's reach beyond a public commercial offer open to all comers.
Concurrences and dissents
Concurrence — Justice Powell
Justice Powell said that if writing on a blank slate he might have agreed the statute was not meant to restrict private contract choices, but felt bound by recent precedent. He stressed the ruling should not be read to require probing the motives behind every private refusal to contract, distinguishing truly personal relationships (like hiring a babysitter or tutor) from a commercial offer made openly to the public, which is what these schools made.
Concurrence — Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens said he believed the Court's earlier interpretation of the statute was historically wrong and would have voted to reverse on a clean slate, since the law's drafters likely never intended to ban private school segregation. But he concluded that respecting settled precedent and the law's fit with modern values outweighed his doubts, so he joined the majority rather than reopening the question.
Dissent — Justice White
“It is doubtful that all such refusals could be considered badges or incidents of slavery within Congress' proscriptive power under the Thirteenth Amendment.”White's argument that the law's constitutional basis was too narrow to justify banning all private racial refusals to contract.
Justice White argued the statute's text and legislative history show it only bars discriminatory state laws, not purely private refusals to contract, pointing to an 1883 Supreme Court case reading the law the same way. He warned the ruling would drag courts into policing private associational choices in schools, clubs, and hiring relationships that Congress never intended to regulate, and said any such expansion should come from Congress, not judicial reinterpretation.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court read a Reconstruction-era statute guaranteeing 'the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens' as prohibiting racial discrimination not just by governments but by private individuals and businesses, following its earlier ruling in a companion statute's case that reached private discrimination in property sales.
- Because that earlier case had already interpreted the shared legislative history behind both statutes to cover private conduct, and later decisions had reaffirmed that reading for employment and recreational-club contexts, the Court treated the private-conduct interpretation as settled law it would not revisit.
- Applying that rule to the facts, the Court found that the parents' effort to pay for schooling was a classic contract offer open to the public, and that the schools' refusal to deal with Black applicants solely because of race was exactly the kind of discrimination the statute forbids.
- Turning to the schools' constitutional defenses, the Court held that a First Amendment right of association protects the belief in segregation and the choice to attend segregated schools, but does not extend to a right to exclude people from an offer already made open to the public.
- The Court found no violation of parents' rights to direct their children's education, because the law left schools completely free to teach any values or curriculum they wished — it only barred using race as a gatekeeping criterion for entry.
- The Court concluded that no recognized privacy right shields a private school's admissions policy when the school holds its doors open to the general public, so the statute could be applied without violating the Constitution.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. (392 U.S. 409)
The Court leaned on this case's ruling that the related 1866 law bans private racial discrimination in property sales.
Reaffirms Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn. (410 U.S. 431)
The Court relied on this case as confirming the same civil rights law reaches private clubs' discriminatory practices.
Reaffirms Johnson v. Railway Express Agency (421 U.S. 454)
The Court relied on this case's holding that the law bars racial discrimination in private employment contracts.