Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.
The Supreme Court ruled that a federal court could not block a criminal prosecution against the one bar that had already been charged with violating a town's topless-dancing ban, because federal courts must generally let ongoing state prosecutions play out.
But the Court said the other two bars, which had not been prosecuted, could still get a preliminary injunction against the ordinance, since they faced a real risk of business losses and the ban looked broad enough to sweep in constitutionally protected expression.
“The principle underlying Younger and Samuels is that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate constitutional claims, and therefore a federal court should, in all but the most exceptional circumstances, refuse to interfere with an ongoing state criminal proceeding.”
Explains why federal courts generally stay out of pending state prosecutions under Younger.
How it got here: A federal district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the ordinance against all three bars; the Second Circuit affirmed, and the town's attorney sought Supreme Court review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Three bar operators in a New York town offered topless dancing until the town passed an ordinance banning bare breasts in public places. One bar, M&L, briefly stopped and then resumed topless dancing after filing a federal lawsuit, and it was criminally charged. The other two bars, Salem Inn and Tim-Rob, waited and were never charged, but all three sought to stop the town from enforcing the ordinance while their constitutional challenge proceeded.
The question before the Court
When one topless-dancing bar got criminally charged after suing, but two others didn't, could a federal court still block the town from enforcing its topless-dancing ban against all three?
Why it matters
The ruling tells bar owners and other businesses that suing first and waiting for a court ruling protects their ability to get federal relief, while violating a law and getting charged before the case is resolved can shut off that option. It also clarifies for lower courts when they may issue preliminary injunctions against enforcement of laws that haven't yet been used against a plaintiff.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower courts: M&L's request for injunctive and declaratory relief is barred while its state prosecution proceeds, though the Court left open whether special circumstances might later excuse that bar. Salem and Tim-Rob keep their preliminary injunction while the underlying constitutional challenge to the ordinance is still litigated on the merits, since the Court expressly did not decide whether the ordinance is ultimately constitutional.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether the topless-dancing ordinance is ultimately constitutional — it only ruled on whether a preliminary injunction and declaratory relief were available given the abstention doctrine from Younger v. Harris, expressly reserving the merits question for further proceedings below.
Concurrences and dissents
How the Justices voted
Majority (1). Justice Rehnquist (author).
Separate writings (1). Justice Douglas (author of a opinion).
Dissent in part — Justice Douglas
“I do not condone the conduct of M & L in violating the challenged ordinance without awaiting judicial action on its federal complaint, but like the Court of Appeals, I find no compelling reason to distinguish M & L from the other respondents in terms of the relief which is appropriate.”Douglas explains why he would have granted M&L the same relief as the other bars.
Justice Douglas, still adhering to his view that Younger v. Harris was wrongly decided, agreed that Salem and Tim-Rob deserved a preliminary injunction. But he would have gone further and let M&L keep its relief too, finding no good reason to treat M&L differently from the other two bars just because it resumed topless dancing before the court ruled.
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court explained that under Younger v. Harris, a federal court should generally refuse to interfere with an already-pending state criminal case, because state courts are equally capable of deciding constitutional claims.
- The Court rejected treating all three bars as a single unit for this purpose, holding instead that each business's entitlement to relief must be judged on its own facts, since the bars were separately owned even though they shared lawyers and a similar business.
- Because M&L chose to resume topless dancing and was criminally charged just days after filing suit, before any federal court had ruled on anything, Younger required the federal court to stay out of that prosecution, and under Samuels v. Mackell the same reasoning barred M&L from getting even a declaratory judgment instead.
- Because Salem and Tim-Rob had never been charged when the injunction was issued, Younger's limits did not apply to them, and under Steffel v. Thompson they were clearly entitled to at least a declaratory ruling on the ordinance.
- The Court then decided a previously open question: when no state prosecution is pending, a preliminary injunction is judged under the ordinary standard of likely success on the merits and irreparable harm, not under Younger's stricter limits for blocking pending prosecutions.
- Applying that standard, the Court found the ordinance's ban on bare breasts in 'any public place' likely reached well beyond bars serving liquor into theaters and other venues showing protected art, and combined with the bars' risk of serious business losses, that was enough to support the preliminary injunction for Salem and Tim-Rob.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Younger v. Harris (401 U.S. 37)
Its bar on blocking pending state prosecutions was applied to deny relief to the bar already facing criminal charges.
Reaffirms Samuels v. Mackell (401 U.S. 66)
Its rule against declaratory relief when a prosecution is pending was applied to the already-charged bar.
Distinguishes California v. LaRue (409 U.S. 109)
Its liquor-licensing rationale for banning nude dancing did not cover this ordinance, which reached far beyond bars.