Richardson v. Ramirez
The Supreme Court ruled that California could keep denying the vote to people who had fully completed their felony sentences and parole, reversing a state court decision that had found this unconstitutional.
The decision rested on a rarely-used part of the Fourteenth Amendment that specifically carves out crime-based voting restrictions from the usual equal-protection analysis, meaning states remain free to permanently disenfranchise ex-felons unless they change their own laws.
“We hold that the understanding of those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, as reflected in the express language of § 2 and in the historical and judicial interpretation of the Amendment’s applicability to state laws disenfranchising felons, is of controlling significance”
The Court's central holding that history and the amendment's text support felon disenfranchisement laws.
How it got here: The California Supreme Court ruled for the ex-felons on equal-protection grounds but denied a writ compelling registration; a county clerk sought Supreme Court review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Three men — convicted of felonies in California and Texas — had completed their prison time and parole and tried to register to vote in their home counties. County election officials turned them away because California's constitution barred anyone convicted of an "infamous crime" from voting. The men sued, arguing this permanent ban violated their right to equal treatment under the law once they had fully served their sentences.
The question before the Court
Can a state permanently bar people from voting once they've completed their sentence and parole for a felony conviction?
The Court's answer
Yes — the Court ruled that California could permanently deny the vote to people who had completed their felony sentences and parole. The key move was reading Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reduces a state's congressional representation for denying the vote to men for reasons "other than participation in rebellion, or other crime," as proof that the amendment's framers accepted crime-based disenfranchisement as legitimate.
Because Section 2 treats felon disenfranchisement as an accepted exception rather than a wrong to be punished, the Court held it could not read the general equal-protection language of Section 1 as secretly forbidding the very practice Section 2 assumed was allowed. This made felon disenfranchisement different from other voting restrictions the Court had struck down under strict scrutiny, since those restrictions had no comparable textual sanction elsewhere in the amendment.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Millions of Americans with past felony convictions can be permanently shut out of voting even long after they've served their time, because states retain wide latitude to disenfranchise them without meeting the tough constitutional test used for most other voting restrictions. Change would have to come from state legislatures or voters, not the courts.
What changes now
The case is sent back to the California Supreme Court, which must now consider the ex-felons' separate argument that county-by-county inconsistency in enforcing the disqualification denied them equal treatment — a claim the state court hadn't yet addressed. California's disenfranchisement law itself remains in effect for now, though the state could still change it through its own legislative or constitutional process.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether California's uneven, county-by-county enforcement of the felon voting ban itself violates equal protection — that question was sent back to the California Supreme Court to consider. The ruling also doesn't require states to disenfranchise felons; it only holds the Constitution doesn't forbid it.
Concurrences and dissents
How the Justices voted
Majority (1). Justice RehNquist (author).
Dissent (2). Justice Marshall (author).
Dissent — Justice Marshall
“The ballot is the democratic system's coin of the realm. To condition its exercise on support of the established order is to debase that currency beyond recognition.”Marshall's warning about using disenfranchisement to punish disfavored political views.
Justice Marshall argued the Court lacked jurisdiction because the California Supreme Court's judgment rested on an independent state ground and because no live case or controversy existed between the parties actually before the Court. On the merits, he argued Section 2 was never meant to limit Section 1's equal-protection guarantee and that under ordinary strict-scrutiny analysis, California had not shown blanket felon disenfranchisement served any compelling, narrowly tailored interest. Read the full dissent →
Dissent — Justice Douglas
Justice Douglas agreed with the jurisdictional portion of Marshall's dissent, saying he could not conclude the California judgment did not rest on an independent state law ground, and therefore dissented from the Court's reversal on that basis alone. Read the full dissent →
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court looked beyond the general Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to a less-cited part of the same amendment, Section 2, which reduces a state's congressional representation if it denies the vote to men for reasons other than 'participation in rebellion, or other crime.'
- Because that provision expressly allows states to strip voting rights for crime without losing representation, the Court reasoned the amendment's drafters could not have meant the general equal-protection language in Section 1 to forbid outright the very kind of disenfranchisement Section 2 treated as an accepted exception.
- The Court reviewed the historical record — committee debates, floor statements by the amendment's framers, and the fact that 29 states already disenfranchised felons when the amendment was adopted — and found this consistently understood to permit crime-based voting bans.
- The Court also noted that Congress required former Confederate states, as a condition of rejoining the Union, to adopt constitutions allowing an exception to voting rights for felony convictions, reinforcing that the amendment's drafters accepted such laws.
- Based on this history, the Court held that felon disenfranchisement is different from other voting restrictions the Court had previously struck down, because it carries the amendment's own built-in approval, so it does not need to survive the strict compelling-interest test applied to other voting-rights cases.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Distinguishes Otsuka v. Hite
Cited only for California's own definition of 'infamous crime,' not disturbed by this decision.