Fuller v. Oregon

1974-05-20

Headline: Oregon’s law upheld allowing the State to require convicted former indigents to repay costs of court‑appointed counsel, permitting repayment conditions on probation when ability to pay and hardship protections exist.

Holding: The Court upheld Oregon’s recoupment statute, ruling the State may require convicted former indigents to repay appointed counsel costs and may condition probation on repayment if ability to pay and hardship safeguards are present.

Real World Impact:

Allows states to require former indigent convicts to repay appointed counsel costs.
Permits courts to make repayment a probation condition if defendant can pay.
Requires courts to consider ability to pay and manifest hardship before enforcing repayment.

Topics: criminal defense costs, right to counsel, probation conditions, equal protection

Summary

Background

A man named Fuller pleaded guilty to a criminal charge and was given a court‑appointed lawyer and an investigator because he said he was indigent. Oregon later sentenced him to five years’ probation and ordered him to reimburse the county for the attorney’s and investigator’s fees. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court agreed to decide whether Oregon may require repayment when an indigent later acquires the means to pay.

Reasoning

The central question was whether the State may seek repayment of defense costs from a convicted person who was indigent at trial but later becomes able to pay. The Court reviewed Oregon’s recoupment law and its limits: repayment may be imposed only on convicted defendants, only when the court finds the person “is or will be able to pay,” the court must consider the defendant’s finances and hardship, the defendant may petition for remission for “manifest hardship,” and nonpayment is not punished unless it is a knowing, contumacious default. The Court concluded the statute is carefully tailored and does not unconstitutionally deny equal protection or the right to counsel under the federal Constitution.

Real world impact

The ruling means some states may require repayment by former indigent defendants who later can pay, and courts may make repayment a probation condition so long as ability and hardship safeguards are observed. It leaves room for future challenges about state‑law limits or different factual records.

Dissents or concurrances

Justice Marshall (joined by Justice Brennan) dissented, arguing the law discriminates against indigent defendants because failure to pay can lead to probation revocation and imprisonment, treating indigent defendants worse than those who hire counsel. Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment, emphasizing the narrow construction and the statute’s safeguards.