Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond
Headline: Richmond school desegregation ruling lets parents and their lawyers recover fees under a new federal law for work done before the law took effect, vacating the appeals court and sending the case back for fee proceedings.
Holding: The Court ruled the federal fee law applies while a fee award is pending on appeal, letting the trial court in its discretion award reasonable attorneys’ fees for services rendered from March 10, 1970 through April 5, 1971 or later.
- Allows parents and their lawyers to recover attorneys’ fees for services rendered before the law took effect.
- Makes courts able to award fees after interim or final desegregation orders are entered.
- Encourages private lawyers to bring desegregation suits by improving chances of fee recovery.
Summary
Background
A group of Black parents sued the Richmond, Virginia, school board in 1961 to end racially segregated schools. After years of litigation, changing plans, and multiple appeals, the parents asked the trial court on March 10, 1970, both to force a prompt move to a unitary, nonracial system and to award attorneys’ fees for the work their lawyers had done. The trial court awarded fees for work from March 10, 1970, to January 29, 1971; the Fourth Circuit reversed, and the appeal was pending when Congress enacted § 718 of the Emergency School Aid Act in 1972.
Reasoning
The central question was whether the new federal fee law could support fee awards for services performed before the law took effect when the fee question was pending on appeal. The Court applied the principle that an appellate court should follow the law in effect when it decides a case, unless applying it would cause manifest injustice. The Court found no such injustice here, noted the public character of desegregation litigation, and concluded § 718 could apply to a case where a fee award was pending on appeal. The Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and said the district court could, in its discretion, award reasonable fees for services from March 10, 1970, up to or beyond April 5, 1971.
Real world impact
The decision makes the new statute a usable basis for fee awards in ongoing school desegregation suits and thus can ease the financial burden on parents and lawyers who press school boards to desegregate. The ruling is not a final determination of the amount of fees; the case was sent back for further proceedings to determine appropriate fees consistent with the opinion.
Dissents or concurrances
The Fourth Circuit had one judge dissenting below who questioned whether the petitioners were yet the "prevailing party" for the earlier fee period; two Justices did not participate in the decision at this Court.
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