Storer v. Brown

Background

The plaintiffs were four people seeking to appear on California ballots as independents. Two were congressional hopefuls who had been registered Democrats earlier in 1972. Two others sought to run for President and Vice President and belonged to the Communist Party, which was not qualified for California ballot access. They challenged California rules that bar independents who voted in the previous primary or who were party‑registered within the prior year, and that require petition signatures equal to 5% of the last general‑election vote gathered in a 24‑day window from non‑primary voters.

Reasoning

The main question was whether these rules unconstitutionally burdened associational and voting rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that the one‑year disaffiliation and primary‑voting bars could be justified by California’s interest in preserving its direct primary system and political stability, so the two congressional claimants were properly barred for 1972. But the Court found insufficient factual findings about the signature burden on the presidential candidates and therefore vacated and remanded that part of the case for the district court to determine how many signatures were required, who could sign, and whether the 5% quota in a 24‑day window unconstitutionally reduced the available signer pool.

Real world impact

As a result, some independent hopefuls like the two congressional claimants were denied ballot access under the one‑year rule, while high‑profile presidential independents got more judicial review. The decision leaves the disaffiliation rule enforceable in many cases but requires additional factfinding before enforcing tight signature and timing rules. Candidates who cannot qualify may still rely on California’s write‑in procedures.

Dissents or concurrances

A three‑Justice dissent argued the one‑year disaffiliation rule was too burdensome and that the State failed to show less restrictive alternatives; the dissent also used official vote totals to argue the signature requirement effectively amounted to about 9–10% of eligible signers and was unconstitutional.