Mullin v. Al Otro Lado
The Court ruled that migrants standing in Mexico have not 'arrived in the United States' and so are not yet entitled to be inspected or to apply for asylum, even if a border officer physically blocks them at the threshold of a port of entry.
The decision upholds the government's ability to use 'metering' — stationing officers at the border to limit how many people are processed each day — and rejects the argument that the asylum and inspection laws protect people the moment they reach, but have not yet crossed, the boundary line.
How it got here: A federal district court ruled the border metering policy unlawful and the Ninth Circuit affirmed; the government asked the Supreme Court to review that decision.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Starting in 2016, U.S. border officials began "metering" — limiting how many migrants they would process each day at ports of entry — by stationing officers at the border to block additional entrants. Asylum seekers and an immigration-advocacy group sued, arguing this practice unlawfully denied inspection and asylum access to people who showed up at the border seeking entry, even though the government later rescinded the policy.
The question before the Court
Does someone standing on the Mexican side of the border "arrive in the United States" for asylum and inspection purposes, or only once they actually cross into the country?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that a migrant standing on the Mexican side of the border has not "arrived in the United States," even if a border officer physically blocks them right at the threshold of a port of entry. The asylum and inspection statutes only apply once a person actually crosses into U.S. territory, so the government's practice of stationing officers at the boundary to limit daily processing (known as "metering") does not violate those laws.
The Court reached this conclusion by reading the phrase "arrives in the United States" according to its everyday meaning, by looking at how neighboring provisions of immigration law use different language for attempted entry, and by applying a rule that federal laws are presumed not to reach outside U.S. territory unless Congress clearly says so. The Court acknowledged this reading creates some overlap with a separate phrase covering people "physically present" in the U.S., but found that acceptable rather than stretching the words beyond their ordinary meaning.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Asylum seekers waiting at the U.S.-Mexico border can be turned back by officers before they set foot on U.S. soil, without triggering a legal duty to inspect them or accept asylum applications. The ruling gives the government room to reinstate metering-style policies, while critics warn it may push more people toward dangerous illegal crossings instead of waiting at official crossing points.
What changes now
The case is sent back to the lower courts for further proceedings consistent with the Court's interpretation, meaning the declaratory judgment against the government's metering practice cannot stand as written. Because the metering policy was already rescinded in 2021, the practical effect going forward is that the government retains the legal option to reinstate a similar border-metering practice without violating the asylum and inspection statutes as interpreted here.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether any future, more extreme border policy that permanently prevented people from ever applying for asylum would be lawful, saying only that such a policy would likely face a quick legal challenge. It also did not resolve whether classwide declaratory relief is available under a separate provision limiting court injunctions in immigration cases, a question Justice Thomas flagged but the majority left open.
Concurrences and dissents
How the Justices voted
Majority (6). Justice Alito (author), joined by Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett.
Dissent (3). Justice Sotomayor (author), joined by Justice Kagan and Justice Jackson.
Concurrence — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas agreed with the majority in full but wrote separately to argue that the lower courts likely violated a statute stripping courts of jurisdiction to issue classwide injunctions in immigration cases, even though the relief was labeled 'declaratory.' He also argued that requiring the President to admit aliens against his will could unconstitutionally infringe the President's inherent authority to exclude aliens from the country.
Dissent — Justice Sotomayor
“The Court today holds that the Executive Branch may circumvent all these mandatory procedures by having U. S. immigration officers stand at the border and physically block noncitizens from setting a foot onto U. S. soil.”Sotomayor's central objection to the majority's interpretation of the asylum and inspection statutes.
Justice Sotomayor argued that read in context, the phrase 'arrives in the United States' covers people in the process of arriving at a port of entry, not just those who have physically crossed, pointing to neighboring statutory language, longstanding federal regulations, and legislative history. She warned the majority's rule lets officials evade mandatory inspection and asylum duties simply by physically blocking people at the line, incentivizing dangerous illegal crossings and contradicting the humanitarian purpose of U.S. asylum law.
Dissent — Justice Jackson
Justice Jackson argued the Court should never have taken the case at all because the metering policy had been rescinded years earlier, making the dispute an advisory opinion decided without a real factual record about how metering actually works. She joined Sotomayor's dissent on the merits but wrote separately to stress that the Court should have waited for a live, concrete metering dispute before ruling. Read the full dissent →
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court read the statutory phrase 'arrives in the United States' according to its ordinary meaning, reasoning that a person arrives in a place only upon entering it — being blocked at the threshold does not count as arriving, just as a football player tackled at the one-yard line has not arrived in the end zone.
- The Court then looked at surrounding statutory context: other immigration provisions expressly cover both actual entry and 'attempted' entry, or refer to aliens arriving 'near' the border, but the two provisions at issue used neither phrase — a sign Congress meant something narrower here.
- The Court considered the canon against reading statutory words as redundant, since a rival reading would make 'arrives in the United States' entirely overlap with 'physically present in the United States.' The Court found the overlap only partial and attributed it to Congress simply matching the 'arrival' language to a new expedited-removal process created in 1996, rather than treating it as proof of a broader meaning.
- As an additional and independent basis, the Court invoked the presumption against extraterritoriality — the idea that federal statutes are read to apply only inside U.S. territory unless Congress clearly says otherwise — and concluded that reading the provisions to cover people still standing in Mexico would give them impermissible extraterritorial reach.
- Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the asylum and inspection duties are not triggered until a person actually crosses into U.S. territory, so the government's practice of stopping people at the boundary line did not violate the statutes.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. (509 U. S. 155)
The Court relied on Sale's holding that refugee treaty protections do not apply to people outside U.S. territory.
Reaffirms Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez (596 U. S. 543)
Thomas's concurrence relied on this case's bar against classwide injunctions in immigration enforcement cases.