OCTOBER TERM 1972 · DECIDED MAY 14, 1973

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McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green

Vacated and remandedFinal ruling
employment discriminationcivil rightsworkplace lawrace discriminationTitle VII

Opinion of the Court by Justice Powell

The Court ruled that an employer can lawfully refuse to rehire someone for taking part in illegal protests against it, but only if that reason isn't a cover for race discrimination and is applied the same way regardless of race.

The decision lays out a now-famous three-step framework for proving workplace race discrimination when there's no direct evidence of bias: the worker must first show basic facts suggesting discrimination, the employer must then give a legitimate reason for its decision, and the worker gets a final chance to show that reason was actually a pretext.

Nothing in Title VII compels an employer to absolve and rehire one who has engaged in such deliberate, unlawful activity against it.
Justice Powell

The Court's core reasoning on why the company's stated justification could be legitimate.

How it got here: A trial court dismissed the worker's race-discrimination claim and ruled for the company; an appeals court revived the race claim and sent it back for trial, and the Supreme Court took the case to clarify the standards.

The Case in Depth

What happened

A Black civil rights activist who had worked as a mechanic for an aerospace manufacturer was laid off in a workforce reduction. He then took part in illegal demonstrations against the company, including blocking a plant access road and a related lock-in at a company building. When the company later advertised for mechanics, he reapplied but was turned down, and the company said it was because of his role in the illegal protests.

The question before the Court

Could a company lawfully refuse to rehire a civil rights activist who had taken part in illegal protests against it, or did that refusal amount to race discrimination under federal law?

Why it matters

This case created the basic roadmap that courts still use to evaluate ordinary workplace discrimination claims when a worker has no direct proof of bias — most Title VII cases decided since rely on some version of this three-step process. For workers, it means a rejection can be challenged as pretextual even after an employer offers a seemingly neutral reason; for employers, it means legitimate business reasons for personnel decisions can defeat a discrimination claim if applied evenhandedly.

What changes now

The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's ruling and sent the case back to the trial court so the worker could pursue his race-discrimination claim under the framework just announced. On remand, he would get a full opportunity to show the company's stated reason for not rehiring him was actually a cover for racial bias; if the trial judge found no such pretext, the company's refusal to rehire would stand.

What this does not decide

The Court did not decide whether the worker's rejection was actually discriminatory — it sent that question back to the trial court. It also did not decide whether unlawful conduct not directed at the employer itself, or every kind of past misconduct, could justify a refusal to hire in other cases.

How the Court got there

The legal reasoning, step by step

  1. The Court held that a worker bringing a race discrimination claim without direct proof of bias must first establish a 'prima facie case' — basic facts that, if unexplained, suggest discrimination — by showing he belongs to a racial minority, applied for an open job he was qualified for, was rejected, and the employer kept seeking applicants with his qualifications afterward.
  2. Once the worker clears that threshold, the burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the rejection; the Court rejected the lower court's suggestion that a 'subjective' business reason automatically counts for less than an objective one.
  3. The Court found the company's reason — the worker's participation in illegal, disruptive protests specifically targeting the company, including blocking a plant access road during rush hour — was sufficient on its face to satisfy that burden, drawing an analogy to an earlier labor-law case holding that federal law does not force employers to keep employees who commit unlawful acts against them.
  4. Even after the employer gives a legitimate reason, the worker must get a fair chance to show that reason was actually a pretext for discrimination, such as by pointing to white employees who committed comparable misconduct but were still hired or kept on, or evidence of the company's broader hiring patterns.
  5. The Court distinguished this case from an earlier ruling striking down neutral-seeming employment tests that excluded Black applicants, explaining that case involved a testing barrier unrelated to job performance, whereas here the worker had engaged in real unlawful conduct directly against the employer he sought to rejoin.

Doctrinal impact

Laws and provisions at issue

Title VII § 703(a)(1)

Bars employers from making job decisions because of someone's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Title VII § 704(a)

Bars employers from punishing workers or applicants for opposing discriminatory practices.

Cases affected by this decision

Distinguishes Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (401 U.S. 424)

The Court said Griggs involved neutral tests excluding minorities, unlike this case involving real unlawful conduct against the employer.

Reaffirms NLRB v. Fansteel Corp. (306 U.S. 240)

The Court relied on this labor-law ruling to support that employers need not retain workers who committed unlawful acts against them.

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McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green | SCOTUS Reporter