Blanche v. Lau
The Court ruled that border officers did not need clear-and-convincing proof, at the moment a green-card holder re-entered the country, that he had committed a crime before treating him as a new applicant for admission rather than someone already admitted.
The decision lets the government rely on evidence gathered later, at the removal hearing, to justify the earlier border decision — a result the dissent warns strips green-card holders of a key legal protection at the border.
How it got here: An immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals ordered Lau removed; the Second Circuit vacated that order, and the government sought Supreme Court review.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Muk Choi Lau, a Chinese citizen and lawful permanent resident since 2007, was charged by New Jersey with trademark counterfeiting in 2012. While the charge was pending, he briefly traveled to China. When he tried to re-enter the U.S., a border officer, aware of the pending charge, did not treat him as already admitted but instead paroled him into the country pending the criminal case's outcome.
The question before the Court
Can immigration officers treat a green-card holder returning from a trip abroad as if he were newly seeking entry, based only on a pending criminal charge that is later proven at a removal hearing?
The Court's answer
No — the Immigration and Nationality Act does not require border officers to have clear and convincing evidence, at the moment of re-entry, that a lawful permanent resident committed a crime involving moral turpitude before treating him as an applicant seeking admission rather than someone already admitted. The Court held that removal on inadmissibility grounds works in two steps: only commission of the crime is needed at the border to treat someone as seeking admission, while conviction or admission of the crime is needed later to actually find him inadmissible.
Because nothing in the statute imposes a clear-and-convincing-evidence burden on border officers specifically, and existing agency precedent applies that standard only at the later removal hearing, the government could rely on Lau's subsequent guilty plea — evidence developed after he was paroled — to satisfy its burden. The Court left open whether Lau's crime actually counts as one involving moral turpitude.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Lawful permanent residents who travel abroad while facing pending criminal charges may be paroled rather than formally admitted upon return, and can be held in that uncertain status — with only a temporary document instead of a green card — until the government later proves the underlying crime at a removal hearing, even years afterward.
What changes now
The case returns to the Second Circuit, which must now decide the separate question the Court did not reach: whether Lau's trademark-counterfeiting conviction actually counts as a crime involving moral turpitude. If it does not, Lau could still avoid removal on that basis. This is a final merits ruling on the sequencing question, not a temporary order.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether Lau's counterfeiting conviction actually qualifies as a 'crime involving moral turpitude,' nor whether the government bears any burden of proof at the border at all — only that if there is such a burden, the clear-and-convincing standard need not be met until the removal hearing.
Concurrences and dissents
How the Justices voted
Majority (6). Justice Thomas (author), joined by Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett.
Dissent (3). Justice Jackson (author), joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan.
Dissent — Justice Jackson
“I worry that the Court has now handed the Government a massive blank check.”Jackson's summary objection to letting the government justify border decisions with later-gathered evidence.
Justice Jackson argued the statute's 'shall not be regarded as seeking an admission' language creates a default that only flips if the government determines, at the border itself, that an exception applies — not later at a removal hearing. She contended the majority's sequencing lets the government first demote a resident's status and only later justify that decision with after-the-fact evidence, exposing residents to detention, confiscated green cards, and years of legal limbo. She would have held the government needed sufficient certainty about the crime at the time of the border decision, not merely by the removal hearing. Read the full dissent →
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- Removing a lawful permanent resident on grounds that he is inadmissible works in two steps: step one only requires that the person committed a qualifying crime to treat him as seeking admission rather than already admitted; step two requires an actual conviction or admission to find him inadmissible.
- The Court read the statute's use of the word 'committed' rather than 'convicted' to mean that a border officer may treat a returning resident as seeking admission as soon as he committed the crime, even if the conviction comes later.
- The Court found nothing in the statute requiring the government to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, at the border itself, that the resident committed the crime — the statute imposes clear evidentiary burdens elsewhere but not here.
- The Court concluded that an existing Board of Immigration Appeals rule requiring clear and convincing evidence applies only at the later removal hearing, not at the border, so the government could rely on evidence developed after the border encounter, including a subsequent guilty plea.
- Applying this framework, the Court found Lau's guilty plea to the New Jersey charge was clear and convincing evidence — established at the hearing — that he had committed the crime before he tried to re-enter, so he was properly charged as an applicant seeking admission who was inadmissible.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Barton v. Barr (590 U. S. 220)
The Court relies on Barton's two-step framework and its reading of 'committed' versus 'convicted.'