Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe
The Court ruled that federal courts can no longer create new lawsuits for violations of international law under the centuries-old Alien Tort Statute, cutting off claims that Cisco Systems aided China's surveillance and torture of Falun Gong practitioners.
The decision also holds that a related 1991 law protecting torture victims does not cover people who merely helped a torturer, sharply narrowing two of the main legal tools human-rights victims have used to sue companies and individuals in U.S. courts.
“Today, we close the door that Sosa cracked and hold that courts may not create new causes of action for violations of international norms.”
The Court's central holding ending judicially created lawsuits under the Alien Tort Statute.
How it got here: A federal trial court dismissed the suit; the Ninth Circuit reversed, allowing aiding-and-abetting claims under both statutes; Cisco asked the Supreme Court to review that ruling.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Practitioners of Falun Gong, a religious movement banned in China, say the Chinese government tortured, detained, and killed thousands of its members. They allege Cisco Systems built a mass-surveillance system, the "Golden Shield," that let Chinese authorities identify and track Falun Gong members, and that Cisco and its executives knowingly helped enable the resulting abuses.
The question before the Court
A tech company allegedly helped China's government track and torture religious dissidents. Could courts still create new lawsuits against companies like this under a 1789 law for violating international human-rights norms?
The Court's answer
No — the Court ruled that federal courts may no longer create new causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute for violations of international law, closing off the aiding-and-abetting claims against Cisco. It also ruled that a related 1991 law, the Torture Victim Protection Act, does not cover aiding-and-abetting liability, because its text reaches only people who directly cause someone to be tortured.
Both rulings rest on separation-of-powers concerns: the Court found that creating new legal remedies is a job for Congress, not judges, especially in cases that touch on foreign policy. The case goes back to the lower courts, where the plaintiffs' claims against Cisco and its executives will be dismissed under this new understanding of both statutes.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Companies that do business with repressive foreign governments will face less exposure to U.S. lawsuits over human-rights abuses committed abroad. Victims of torture, forced labor, and similar international-law violations lose a major legal avenue for holding corporations and individuals accountable, shifting responsibility for addressing these harms to Congress and the executive branch instead of the courts.
What changes now
The case returns to the lower courts, where the plaintiffs' claims against Cisco and its executives will be dismissed because no legal claim remains available under either statute. This is a final merits decision, not a temporary order, and it forecloses future lawsuits seeking new judge-made causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute nationwide, though it leaves intact three historically recognized categories of such lawsuits.
What this does not decide
The Court left untouched three specific types of lawsuits the Alien Tort Statute has long been understood to allow — those involving violations of safe conducts, harm to ambassadors, and piracy. The ruling also does not decide whether the plaintiffs' underlying allegations about China's treatment of Falun Gong members are true.
Concurrences and dissents
How the Justices voted
Majority (6). Justice Barrett (author), joined by Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Kavanaugh.
Dissent (3). Justice Jackson (author), joined by Justice Kagan.
Dissent in part — Justice Jackson
Justice Jackson agrees with Justice Sotomayor that the Alien Tort Statute should still allow courts to recognize aiding-and-abetting liability, disagreeing with the majority's decision to foreclose all future ATS lawsuits. But she agrees with the majority's bottom line that the Torture Victim Protection Act does not cover aiding-and-abetting liability, while rejecting the majority's reasoning that treats a prior securities case as requiring 'magic words' from Congress.
Dissent — Justice Sotomayor
“The Court nonetheless closes the courthouse doors not just to respondents, but to virtually every future litigant seeking redress for a violation of international law under the ATS.”The dissent's central objection that the ruling forecloses far more than this one case.
Justice Sotomayor argues the majority effectively overrules Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain without acknowledging it or justifying departing from precedent, even though Sosa's framework was workable and courts had applied it cautiously for two decades. She contends foreign-policy concerns cut both ways and that shutting the door on all future claims, rather than deciding case by case, abandons victims of torture, forced labor, and genocide. She would also read the Torture Victim Protection Act's word 'subjects' to include aiding and abetting. Read the full dissent →
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court examined its own two-step framework from Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain for deciding when judges may create new lawsuits under the Alien Tort Statute, which requires a well-defined international norm and that it be prudent for courts, rather than Congress, to act. The Court concluded that second step can essentially never be satisfied.
- Because lawsuits alleging violations of international law inherently touch on relations between the United States and foreign governments, the Court reasoned there will always be at least one sound reason for judges to defer to Congress rather than invent a remedy on their own.
- The Court also invoked a principle it has increasingly applied elsewhere: courts should not create new types of lawsuits when Congress has already built an alternative system for similar wrongs — here, the Torture Victim Protection Act, a 1991 law giving certain torture victims a right to sue.
- Applying these principles, the Court concluded no room remains for judges to create new Alien Tort Statute lawsuits, so the claims accusing Cisco of aiding and abetting human-rights abuses could not proceed.
- Turning to the Torture Victim Protection Act itself, the Court relied on Central Bank of Denver, a securities-law case holding that when a statute is silent about 'aiding and abetting,' courts should not read that liability into it. Because the Act's text covers only someone who personally 'subjects' another to torture, the Court held it does not reach people who merely assisted a torturer.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Abrogates Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (542 U. S. 692)
Sosa's allowance for judges to create new international-law lawsuits is effectively eliminated going forward.
Reaffirms Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A. (511 U. S. 164)
Relied on as controlling authority that statutory silence on 'aiding and abetting' forecloses that form of liability.