Hunter v. United States
The Court ruled that a defendant's promise not to appeal his sentence can be set aside when enforcing it would leave in place an egregious error that would embarrass the courts themselves — a "miscarriage of justice."
The decision rejects both a strict rule that would enforce every appeal waiver no matter what, and a narrow rule that only allowed exceptions for illegal-length sentences, instead giving appeals courts a limited safety valve for extreme cases while sending this defendant's specific claim back for the lower court to evaluate.
“an agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice—meaning, when it would leave in place the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute”
The Court's core holding defining when an appeal waiver can be set aside.
How it got here: A district court sentenced Hunter under his plea deal; the Fifth Circuit dismissed his appeal based on the waiver; the Supreme Court agreed to resolve a circuit split.
The Case in Depth
What happened
Munson Hunter was charged with 10 counts of fraud over a scheme that cost banks about half a million dollars. He pleaded guilty to one count in exchange for the government dropping the rest, and he waived his right to appeal his sentence. At sentencing, over Hunter's objection, the judge ordered that he take any mental-health medication his doctor later prescribed, as part of his supervised release.
The question before the Court
If a defendant promises not to appeal his sentence as part of a plea deal, can that promise ever be thrown out because the sentence itself was so unjust?
The Court's answer
Partly — the Court ruled that appeal waivers in plea deals can be set aside, but only in extreme cases. It rejected the government's view that a knowing, voluntary waiver is always enforceable, and also rejected the narrower rule that only sentences above the legal maximum can be appealed despite a waiver. Instead, the Court adopted the approach most appeals courts already use: a waiver is unenforceable when enforcing it would be a "miscarriage of justice" — an egregious, obvious error that would embarrass the courts if left uncorrected, such as a sentence based on race or an unconstitutional condition.
The Court did not decide whether Hunter's own challenge — to a condition requiring him to take prescribed mental-health medication — actually meets that high bar. It sent that specific question back to the Fifth Circuit to decide in the first instance, since the lower court had never applied this standard.
Curious how the Court got there? See the step-by-step legal reasoning →
Why it matters
Roughly 95% of federal convictions come from plea deals, most including appeal waivers. This ruling gives defendants nationwide a narrow but real path to challenge sentences involving forced medication, racial bias, or other extreme errors, even after signing away their appeal rights, while leaving ordinary sentencing mistakes unappealable.
What changes now
The case goes back to the Fifth Circuit, which must now decide whether requiring Hunter to take any prescribed mental-health medication amounts to a miscarriage of justice under the new standard. The Supreme Court did not resolve that question itself. Other circuits will now apply this same miscarriage-of-justice standard when defendants with appeal waivers try to challenge their sentences.
What this does not decide
The Court did not decide whether Hunter's specific forced-medication condition actually qualifies as a miscarriage of justice — that question goes back to the Fifth Circuit. The ruling also does not address other possible ways appeal waivers could be challenged, such as broader arguments that the right to appeal a sentence can never be waived in advance at all.
Concurrences and dissents
How the Justices voted
Majority (8). Justice Kagan (author), joined by Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Barrett, and Justice Jackson.
Dissent (1). Justice Thomas (author).
Concurrence — Justice Gorsuch
Justice Gorsuch traced the historical rise of plea bargaining and appeal waivers, arguing the Court has too often condoned coercive prosecutorial tactics. He offered an expansive reading of what counts as a miscarriage of justice, covering sentencing-guideline errors and unreasonable conditions, and questioned whether appeal waivers can even be validly agreed to in advance given that defendants sign them without knowing their eventual sentence.
Concurrence — Justice Kavanaugh
Justice Kavanaugh joined the Court's opinion in full but wrote separately to stress that the miscarriage-of-justice exception sets a genuinely high bar, and to note his disagreement with Justice Gorsuch's concurrence, which he read as effectively lowering that bar below what the majority opinion actually requires.
Concurrence — Justice Barrett
Justice Barrett wrote to clarify that the Court's decision does not rest on any inherent supervisory power over lower courts, which she doubts exists. Instead, she views the ruling as resting on long-established common-law waiver principles recognizing that certain waivers should not be enforced when doing so would discredit the courts.
Dissent — Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas argued the majority invented a rule with no basis in the Constitution, a statute, or a Federal Rule, relying instead on an unjustified appeal to the Court's supervisory power and vague policy concerns about public perception. He would have enforced Hunter's knowing and voluntary waiver as written, warning the new exception could flood the courts with meritless appeals. Read the full dissent →
How the Court got there
The legal reasoning, step by step
- The Court first considered whether the sentencing judge's offhand statement that Hunter had a right to appeal, combined with the prosecutor's failure to object, had modified or given up the government's ability to enforce the waiver; it concluded that changing the agreement required actual mutual agreement between the parties, which never happened here.
- The Court then turned to the core question: what limits, if any, apply to enforcing a knowing and voluntary appeal waiver. It reasoned that because judges must approve plea deals and appeals courts alone decide whether to enforce waivers, courts have their own institutional stake in the outcome, not just the parties.
- Drawing on cases about waivers of other rights (like a defendant's waiver of conflict-free counsel), the Court reasoned that some errors are so extreme that letting them stand — even with a valid waiver — would discredit the courts' own integrity.
- Because of that institutional stake, the Court rejected both the government's position (waivers are always enforceable) and the lower court's narrower rule (waivers fail only for above-maximum sentences), adopting instead the majority appellate approach: a waiver is unenforceable when enforcing it would be a 'miscarriage of justice.'
- The Court set a high bar for that exception, limited to obvious, egregious errors — like unconstitutional sentencing factors or a sentence imposed without basic fair procedure — rather than ordinary sentencing mistakes.
Doctrinal impact
Cases affected by this decision
Reaffirms Class v. United States (583 U. S. 174)
The Court relied on this case's reasoning that silent acquiescence does not waive or forfeit a party's rights.
Distinguishes Mezzanatto (513 U. S. 196)
The Court used its reasoning about institutional harm but did not extend its narrow holding to appeal waivers.